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Tarkastelen pro gradu –tutkielmassani C. S. Lewisin tunnettua Narnian tarinat -lastenkirjasarjaa 
hyvekasvatuksena, joka on kasvava, Suomeen viime vuosina rantautunut moraalikasvatuksen muoto. 
Tutkimuksessani keskityn erityisesti siihen, minkälaisen kuvan Lewisin kirjasarja antaa moraalisesta 
arvioinnista: minkälaisin perustein on mahdollista erottaa hyvä ja paha, oikea ja väärä. Tukeudun 
tutkimuksessani sekä Lewisin moraalifilosofisiin kirjoituksiin että hyvekasvatuksen traditioon, jotka 
tukevat toisiaan suurelta osin. 
 
Nykymuotoisen hyvekasvatuksen (Character Education) pioneerit ovat hiljattain todenneet C. S. 
Lewisin olevan erityisen ajankohtainen hyvekasvattaja 2000-luvulle, ja Lewisin lastenkirjojen 
pohjalta työstetäänkin parhaillaan hyvekasvatuksen opetussuunnitelmaa oppikirjoineen. Sekä 
hyvekasvattajat että Lewis puolustavat klassista kasvatuskäsitystä, jossa kasvatuksen tarkoituksena 
on rohkaista lasta omaksumaan universaaleiksi tunnustettuja, laajasti eri kulttuureissa ilmeneviä 
hyveitä ja kasvamaan niiden pohjalta hyveelliseksi ihmiseksi. Oleellinen osa hyvekasvatusta on 
moraalisen arviointikyvyn kehittäminen, joka toimii hyveellisen toiminnan pohjana. 
 
Narnia-sarjan kuvaus moraalisesta arvioinnista lähtee Lewisin filosofian mukaisesti oletuksesta, että 
on olemassa objektiivinen hyvä ja paha – universaali moraalilaki, johon ihmisen oikeudentaju ja 
omatunto pohjimmiltaan perustuvat. Sarjan päähenkilöt oppivat täten universaaliin moraalilakiin 
perustuvaa arviointia: seikkailujensa alkumetreillä henkilöhahmot tekevät karkeita virheitä 
arviointikyvyssään katastrofaalisin seurauksin, mutta tarinan edetessä he oppivat perustamaan 
moraalisen päättelynsä objektiivisina kuvattuihin logiikan ja moraalin perimmäisiin lakeihin. 
Korkein moraalisen arvioinnin muoto löytyy kuitenkin hyve-eettisestä imitaation perinteestä, kun 
lapset alkavat pitää jaloa Aslan-leijonaa arviointinsa perustana. Henkilöhahmojen moraalisen kasvun 
lisäksi tutkimus kiinnittää huomiota siihen, miten Narnia-sarja kuvaa yksilön moraalisen 
arviointikyvyn suhdetta kulttuurisiin ilmiöihin kuten kasvatukseen ja yhteiskuntaan. 
 
Tutkimukseni valottaa tapaa, jolla Narnia-sarja kannustaa lukijaansa oppimaan perusteltua moraalista 
arviointia sekä tavoittelemaan johdonmukaista ja hyveellistä elämää sen pohjalta. Toisaalta 
lastensarja painottaa aikuisten roolia lasten moraalikäsitysten vahvistamisessa. Tulokset vahvistavat, 
että Narnia-kirjasarjan kuvaus moraalisesta arviointikyvystä on laajalti yhtenevää sekä Lewisin 
kasvatusfilosofian että hyvekasvatuksen tavoitteiden kanssa. Koska Narnian tarinoita käytetään 
tietoisen hyvekasvatuksen välineenä, annan tutkimukseni tulososiossa myös ehdotukseni, miten 
hyvekasvattajat voisivat hyödyntää kirjasarjan kohtauksia opettaessaan lapsille moraalista arviointia. 
 
 
Asiasanat: C. S. Lewis, Narnian tarinat, hyvekasvatus, moraalinen arviointikyky, lastenkirjallisuus 
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1 Introduction 
The present research sets out to study the function of Clive Staple Lewis’s (1898–1963) children’s 
series, The Chronicles of Narnia, in fostering children’s moral growth. C. S. Lewis’s Narnia novels 
are known as exceptionally popular children’s books, having sold “more than 100 million copies in 
47 languages” (Pike et al. 71). The novels have not only been popular but they have collected lasting 
appreciation from critics. For instance, The Last Battle (1956) won the highly esteemed Carnegie 
Medal in the year of its publication, and in 2008 The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe was selected 
as the best children’s book of all time by BookTrust (McGrath 271). Even more importantly for the 
present research, Lewis’s children’s series is marked with moral themes and virtuous characters, as 
commonly noted in the reviews of the series (for instance, N. Lewis 583; Ross 513; Ojala and 
Saarinen 125). Gayne J. Anacker even argues that the “moral resonance” of the novels is among the 
most loved attributes of the series (130). As Lewis’s children’s series is, on one hand, both popular 
and readily available in multiple languages and, on the other hand, markedly moral in tone, it appears 
to form a particularly promising object of study in considering children’s literature as a means of 
educating children morally. 
In light of these notions, it is quite surprising that C. S. Lewis’s children’s series has only 
recently gained the attention of researchers in the specific field of moral education (Pike et al.). In the 
past few years, The Chronicles of Narnia has drawn interest in a growing branch of moral education 
called the Character Education movement, which, in agreement with the Narnia novels, places 
emphasis on traditional virtues and developing one’s moral character. In addition to the moral quality 
of his children’s literature, C. S. Lewis also interests the character educators due to his extensive 
theoretical writings on moral and educational philosophy that appear to go hand in hand with the 
moral message of his children’s series. According to Mark Pike et al., these two sources – the 
philosophical treatises and a lengthy children’s series with a moral emphasis – make Lewis an 
exceptionally resourceful author for contemporary character educators, and they claim that he is “a 
highly relevant but largely neglected character educator for 21st century” (Pike et al. 71). 
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Discussions on the moral elements of the Narnia novels appear to focus predominantly on the 
portrayal of the Narnian characters and especially their actions that often express a certain virtue or 
vice. For instance, Pike et al. note that the virtues inherent in the series are “displayed—or not 
displayed—by the characters” (77) and that the novels “depict virtuous actions that are admirable and 
have beneficial consequences and, on the other hand, actions that are not virtuous and generally have 
negative consequences” (78). Likewise, Thomas Lickona emphasizes the role of the characters in 
bringing about the desired moral effect of the series by writing that, when encountered by the 
“unforgettable characters” such as the White Witch and Aslan, the child readers of the series “feel 
repelled by the evil and are drawn, irresistibly, to the good” (“What” 247). 
Apart from moral action, there are also other elements in the moral fabric of the Narnia novels 
that are relevant from a character educational point of view. One of these is the Narnian emphasis on 
moral judgment – one’s capacity to discern between good and evil, right and wrong – as Glen Mynott 
notes that the protagonists (and the readers) are initiated into “the distinction between right and 
wrong, good and evil” (40). Moral judgment also constitutes one of the primary subjects that Lewis 
emphasized in his moral philosophy, and the Narnia novels clearly draw from Lewis’s actual beliefs 
on the subject. The significant role of moral judgment in the Narnia books appears not to have been 
studied adequately in any character educational discussions on the children’s series, however, and the 
present study attempts to fill this gap. 
The aim of the present research, then, is to analyze the portrayal of moral judgment in The 
Chronicles of Narnia in the light of Lewis’s moral philosophy and Character Education. The Narnian 
kind of moral judgment is constructed out of multiple elements in the novels, ranging from beliefs 
concerning the nature of morality to actual practices of moral judgment, and the present research 
attempts to analyze the concept from multiple perspectives. Throughout the analysis, the portrayal of 
moral judgment in The Chronicles will be contrasted with Lewis’s theoretical works on moral 
judgment. Additionally, on a more general level, the study views The Chronicles as a form of 
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Character Education, considering the function of the novels as aiming to convey ideas about moral 
judgment to their child readership. 
The present study builds on the previous research on C. S. Lewis’s contribution to 
contemporary Character Education. The Chronicles of Narnia has been studied from a character 
educational perspective by Mark Pike, Victoria Nesfield, and Thomas Lickona, who identified 12 
core virtues in the novels that are congruent with the aims of contemporary Character Education and 
founded the Narnian Virtues project to utilize the books for moral education (Pike et al.). According 
to the project website, the aims of the Narnian Virtues project include designing a character 
educational Narnia curriculum for English classes, including study books to be read alongside 
Lewis’s novels (“About the Project”). The educators have also conducted research to study the effects 
of their curriculum. In their initial study, the researchers tested the Narnian Virtues material in schools 
in the UK and received feedback from the students who tried to apply the Narnian virtues to their 
own lives (Pike et al. 84). Inspired by the results of the study, the character educators implemented a 
large, empirical “3-year research project to further test the Narnian Virtues character education 
curriculum” (84), which is currently underway. In conclusion to their initial research, Pike et al. 
suggest that both Lewis’s educational philosophy and the Narnia books “warrant more attention from 
character educators and researchers than they have received so far” (71). By paying more detailed 
attention to the intricate role that moral judgment plays in the moral fabric of The Chronicles, the 
present thesis sheds further light on the value of Lewis’s children’s series for Character Education, 
and the study hopes to have practical implications for the contemporary character educational 
applications of the series, too. 
In its Finnish context, the thesis also represents one of the first studies on the role of narrative 
fiction in Character Education, with prior research including a doctoral dissertation on oral narratives 
(Liutta) and a master’s thesis on Roald Dahl’s children’s books (Nieminen). In general, moral 
education in the vein of Character Education is still a novel concept in the Finnish educational 
context: Arja Liutta suggests in her dissertation that this approach might reach Finland in the next 10 
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to 15 years (90). Since Liutta’s estimation in 2011, there have been clear signs of growing interest 
towards virtues-based moral schooling in Finland. For example, 2014 saw the launching of Hyveet 
elämässä (‘Virtues in Life’), a virtues-centered moral education program for kindergartens and 
schools (Kylliäinen). Also, the recently published Huomaa hyvä! (‘See the Good!’) manuals seek to 
help educators recognize and strengthen virtues in the children (Uusitalo-Malmivaara and Vuorinen). 
In addition to contributing to the character educational discussions on The Chronicles, then, this thesis 
aims to raise awareness of Character Education as a possible form of moral education in Finland and 
emphasizes the role of children’s literature in it. 
The thesis unfolds in the following manner: The background chapter discusses the concepts of 
children’s literature, Character Education, and the role of children’s literature in ethics. The 
subsequent theory chapter focuses on expounding Lewis’s moral philosophy and the concept of moral 
judgment to the extent they are relevant for understanding the phenomenon of moral judgment in The 
Chronicles of Narnia. The analysis section, then, studies the portrayal of moral judgment in The 
Chronicles in light of Lewis’s moral philosophy. Finally, the relevant findings will be considered in 
the conclusion section, along with a discussion of the Narnia novels as a form of Character Education. 
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2 Background: Children’s Literature and Moral Education 
As the present study touches on theories of both children’s fiction and moral education, these two 
topics will be discussed further in this background chapter. The first section considers the definition 
of children’s literature used in the thesis. Given the complexity of definitions for children’s literature, 
a definition will be opted for that is rooted in literary criticism but that also caters to the specific needs 
of the present study. Then, the phenomenon of contemporary moral education will be discussed, with 
an emphasis on the Character Education movement which is the most relevant strand of moral 
education for the present study. The last section considers the connection between (children’s) 
literature and ethics as well as some relevant characteristics of The Chronicles of Narnia as children’s 
literature. 
2.1 Defining Children’s Literature 
Finding a comprehensive definition for children’s literature has proven so difficult that some have 
even contended that there cannot be a single definition for children’s literature due to the diversity 
and complexity of the genre (Gubar 210). Nonetheless, in the absence of an overall definition there 
can still exist multiple definitions for children’s literature, with each definition suggesting “some part 
of the complex truth” (Nodelman 137). What is attempted here, then, is to provide a definition that is 
especially helpful for considerations of children’s literature in moral education. 
A thorough definition of children’s literature will have to start with a definition of childhood. 
Dictionaries commonly define a child as a person of certain age, and some of them are quite specific 
in their definition such as the Macmillan Dictionary which defines a child as a person from birth to 
“about 14 years old” (“Child”). Childhood, as the term is understood here, is necessarily more than a 
timespan in one’s life, however. John Rowe Townsend has noted that, “Before there could be 
children’s books, there had to be children” (17). What Townsend suggests is that, while there have 
always been children, children’s literature became a separate genre only after childhood was 
recognized and emphasized as a special season in the span of human life. 
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The beginnings of childhood as it is understood nowadays are commonly seen in the Victorian 
period. Kimberley Reynolds notes that childhood had been regarded as a distinct category even before 
the Victorians, but the Victorians nevertheless created “a more self-conscious and sustained myth of 
childhood than any that had gone before” (2). Apart from the fact that childhood began to be idealized 
and distinguished as a special phase in one’s life, there were other reasons for the newfound emphasis 
on childhood, too. For instance, the emergence of industrial capitalism had an important role for the 
new concept, as more parents became financially able to invest in their children (Reynolds 5). It is 
important to note that these changes began with the adults, who had renewed ideas about childhood 
and the money to create it accordingly. In this sense, childhood is essentially a grown-up convention: 
it is created by the parents and guardians who invest in the childhood of their children. This is 
especially true of the definition of childhood implicit in “children’s literature”, as Peter Hunt (51) 
notes that each children’s writer “creates or constructs the childhood that they then address.” The 
child in “children’s literature”, therefore, can be said to reveal primarily beliefs and attitudes about 
the child rather than being a real portrayal of an actual child (51). 
Apart from considering the child, one also needs to discuss what is meant by children’s 
literature. Emer O’Sullivan starts by asking whether children’s literature is primarily literature 
written for, by, or about children, and he concludes that the most defining characteristic of children’s 
literature lies in its audience: it is literature written for children (16). After all, children’s literature is 
rarely written by children, and literature about children is mostly aimed at an adult readership (16). 
If children’s literature only referred to literature that has been written primarily with a child 
readership in mind, however, it would exclude a wealth of literature that could potentially be 
understood as children’s literature. It is generally acknowledged that most pre-modern writings that 
are nowadays read mostly by children (such as ancient folklore and fairy tales) were not originally 
intended for a child readership in particular (Townsend 17; Nikolajeva, Reading 182; Susina 179; E. 
O’Sullivan 18). It was only at the beginning of the nineteenth century that literature written primarily 
for children started to appear at large, and this is often thought to have constituted the point in history 
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when children’s literature became a genre of its own (Nikolajeva, “Children’s Literature” 315; E. 
O’Sullivan 18). 
The exclusion of pre-modern writings from the concept of children’s literature might be 
problematic in the light of moral education, which might value such texts because of their emphasis 
on moral issues. A suitable definition for the present study, then, needs to leave room for texts that 
were not primarily meant as children’s literature but have later become to be considered as such, as 
is the case with many fables, for instance. Including texts such as the fable in the definition of 
children’s literature is especially relevant for the present study since, as will be argued below, The 
Chronicles of Narnia highlights the fable as one of the genres suitable for moral education. Also 
included would need to be texts that have been posthumously appropriated for a child readership. A 
typical example of the latter could be seen, for example, in the many children’s versions of Robinson 
Crusoe, which was primarily intended for an adult audience (Nikolajeva, “Children’s Literature” 
317). 
What we would arrive at, then, approximates Torben Weinreich’s definition of children’s 
literature as  
literature which is written and published for children, that is to say, both the literature 
which is written for children and that which was originally written for adults but which 
has been re-worked with children in mind. (128) 
 
Weinreich’s definition still leaves out texts that are understood nowadays as children’s literature but 
that were originally written for adults and did not undergo any changes. To account for this deficit, 
children’s literature can be here defined as “literature purposed for children”, as such a definition 
leaves the question open whether it was primarily intended for children by its original author or not. 
What is significant is that it is purposed for children at the present. Thus, children’s literature, as 
understood here, is necessarily bound to the ideas of what is appropriate for children in each 
generation. 
As it is the adult who decides on what is appropriate for the child, this takes us to the question 
of the inevitable adult presence in children’s literature. On one hand, as mentioned above, the (adult) 
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author decides on the concept of childhood present in the children’s book. On the other hand, the 
difference in power between the author and the reader is significantly great. This element of power 
difference in age and in status between the author and the intended audience is perhaps the main 
characteristic which distinguishes children’s literature from general fiction, and it is commonly 
emphasized in descriptions of children’s literature (see, for instance, Sarland 56; Nikolajeva, 
“Children’s Literature” 323; E. O’Sullivan 16). Together, these two characteristics can be seen to 
give children’s literature a distinctive didactic outlook. As children’s literature conveys the author’s 
views of childhood and as the child is likely to be influenced by the views due to the power difference 
between the author and the child, children’s literature has an inherent educative function that attempts 
to shape the child reader’s self-image towards the one projected in the text. What kind of images of 
childhood are preferred by the adults, however, is a question related to moral education that is 
discussed in the following section. 
2.2 Moral and Character Education 
Diverse theories and practices are nowadays listed under the umbrella term of moral education,1 
which Marvin W. Berkowitz (897–98) takes to mean “any form of intentional education aimed at 
promoting the growth of moral functioning.” David Carr (“Moral Education” 24–25) identifies three 
main branches of moral education in the post-war field of education: the cognitive psychology-based 
Kohlbergianism, followed by the Values Clarification movement, and the Character Education 
movement. The primarily focus in this chapter will be on Character Education, as Lewis has drawn 
interest mainly within the Character Education movement and as the understanding of moral 
judgment in the present study is more relevant for Character Education than the other strands. For 
instance, Kohlbergianism deals with moral judgment, too, but it focuses solely on moral reasoning, 
which is only a part of moral judgment as the concept is understood in this study. Values Clarification, 
                                                 
1 While the field has other names with different connotations such as values education (esp. in the UK) and character 
education (USA), the term moral education will be preferred in this study because of its claimed “internationally 
recognised” status (Berkowitz 897) and to avoid misunderstanding with the specific strand of Character Education 
referred to in this study. 
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on the other hand, is based on moral relativism (Steutel and Carr 3), which sees values as relative; an 
idea that is in stark contrast with the objective portrayal of morality present in both Character 
Education and The Chronicles as discussed later in the study. 
Historically speaking, understanding “moral education” separately from education in general is 
quite a modern phenomenon. It is commonly observed that, at least since the Ancient Greeks, one of 
the primary foci of education in general has always been on building the learner’s moral character 
(Arthur, “Traditional Approaches” 80; Haldane 157; Kristjánsson 135; Barrow 160; Salls 1). A 
dramatic shift occurred in the middle of the 20th century, when varying reasons such as anti-
traditionalism, value relativism and, in its aftermath, fear of indoctrination caused the tradition to 
cease almost entirely, and a larger emphasis on technical skills and knowledge replaced traditional 
interest in morality (Kristjánsson 135–36). The idea that values are relative affected the teaching 
profession, too, making teachers hesitant about influencing the pupils’ morals explicitly (Ryan and 
Kilpatrick 20; Arthur, Education 113). Nonetheless, a refusal to address values explicitly in a school 
curriculum does not remove the fact that education transmits values, as James Arthur notes, “There 
is no such thing as a ‘value-free’ school ethos” (Education 117). If schools affect the values of their 
pupils in any case, it appears to be more sensible to consider the promoted values consciously rather 
than ignore the phenomenon. Perhaps this explains in part why the situation is changing. Kristján 
Kristjánsson, for instance, notes that, recently, “the tide has turned dramatically […] in favour of 
moral education in general, and character education in particular, at the school level” (136). 
Concerning the Character Education movement, Carr (“Moral Education” 390) writes that the 
movement originated in the USA but is “now steadily gaining ground in other parts of the world such 
as the United Kingdom.” What brought Character Education to public attention in the USA is 
commonly thought to be the influential writings of Thomas Lickona and William Kilpatrick in the 
1990s (Kristjánsson 147), and Character Education is here understood in the form advocated by the 
aforementioned authors. What both Kilpatrick and Lickona had in mind was a renaissance of the 
traditional practice of building good character through virtues, as they both define Character 
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Education essentially as “cultivation of virtues” (Ryan & Kilpatrick 19; Lickona, “Character 
Education” 78). These virtues (or lack of them), then, make up one’s character, which is taken to 
mean “an interlocked set of personal values which normally guide conduct” (Arthur, Education 2). 
The definition of Character Education as “cultivation of virtues” invites the question of what 
are the virtues to be cultivated, in other words, of who decides on the virtues that are to be cultivated. 
The conviction of most character educators appears to be that there are certain basic virtues that are 
objectively good, as Arthur notes that character educators generally believe that moral values are 
“objectively grounded in human nature and experience” (Education 115). Also, Lickona argues that 
the concepts of virtues and virtuous character imply a belief in objective moral truth, and he asserts 
that there are “objectively good human characters such as wisdom, honesty, kindness, and self-
discipline” (“Character Education” 77). Because, in this view, virtues are objective, they are seen to 
transcend cultural, religious and historical barriers (Lickona, “Character Education” 77; Lickona et 
al.). If there indeed exist virtues that transcend culture, it is quite sensible to argue that public 
education in a pluralistic society would do well in focusing (at least) on such values. In practice, 
however, there is no complete consensus among the Character Education theorists on the actual lists 
of universal virtues, but Kristjánsson (138) notes that “virtues such as reliability, honesty, self-
respect, responsibility, truthfulness and compassion figure on most lists.” 
Another relevant question concerning Character Education involves the means: how virtues are 
learned and taught efficiently. Kristjánsson (138–39) notes that, in addition to the belief in universal 
basic values, forms of contemporary Character Education are in general characterized by what he 
calls “methodological substantivism” – a preference of content over method of teaching. Despite this 
general tendency, it appears that the form of Character Education promoted by Kilpatrick and Lickona 
emphasizes the Aristotelian understanding of moral development as habit formation. For instance, 
Lickona (“Character Education” 78) calls Aristotle’s theory of acquiring virtues through habit 
formation as a “core theoretical principle.” Also, Kilpatrick defines Character Education specifically 
as instilling virtue “through the formation of good habits” (Ryan & Kilpatrick 19).  
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In the light of these core characteristics of Character Education, it is easy to observe why C. S. 
Lewis has gained the attention of character educators such as Lickona. First of all, C. S. Lewis 
advocated objective morality and compiled a list of eight core virtues that he believed to be universal. 
While Lewis’s theory on objective morality will be discussed in more detail later, for now it is enough 
to observe that Lewis’s theory is acknowledged to be “congruent with contemporary discussions of 
character education” (Pike et al. 72). Moreover, Lewis shared similar ideas with contemporary 
character education about virtue and growth in it: “a man who perseveres in doing just actions gets 
in the end a certain quality” and “it is this quality rather than the particular actions which we mean 
when we talk of a ‘virtue’” (Mere Christianity 72–73). Not only Lewis’s philosophy, but also The 
Chronicles of Narnia exemplifies similar beliefs, as Pike et al. note that the Narnia novels are 
“excellent examples of literature’s ability to illuminate how events are shaped and character is formed 
by the moral choices we make” (71). 
As a framework on moral education, Character Education has not been exempt from critical 
evaluations, although it has certain advantages in comparison to the other popular strands. For 
instance, Kristjánsson notes that, on one hand, the attempt to set up a universal set of basic values is 
criticized as a form of domination (141), especially by those subscribing to relativistic views of 
morality, and on the other hand, the basic virtues have been criticized as too basic to be of practical 
help in real-life cases (147). Despite the criticisms, Character Education stands out as a 
comprehensive framework in moral education. Compared to Kohlbergianism, for instance, which 
focuses solely on reasoning skills, Character Education has a more holistic goal to influence the moral 
character of the learners. This includes educating the three components of character that Lickona calls 
moral knowing, moral feeling, and moral action: the facilitation of cognitive differentiation between 
right and wrong, the cultivation of (appropriate) moral feelings, and morally-informed habits and 
action (“What” 241). This advantage is relevant also for the present study, as moral judgment (in the 
way the concept is understood here) has both cognitive and emotional elements in it. Moreover, as 
will be argued below, the comprehensiveness of Character Education makes it a relevant framework 
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when one considers children’s literature as moral education, which will be dealt with in the next 
section. 
2.3 Ethics, Children’s Fiction, and Narnia 
The close link between literature and the teaching of ethics has been noted since the beginning of 
philosophy as a discipline. Plato wrote already on the effect fables on children and suggested that 
“the first stories that [children] hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to 
their ears” (Republic 378e). Modern research also emphasizes the importance and unique possibilities 
that fiction has for moral education. For instance, Maria Nikolajeva mentions that fiction helps 
children ponder ethical dilemmas “in a safe mode” and that it provides “ethical experience not easily 
available in real life” (Reading 177–78). 
Authorities in contemporary moral education also appear to agree upon the worth of fiction for 
moral growth. Sheryl O’Sullivan (641) argues that Lawrence Kohlberg, the founder of 
Kohlbergianism, would have acknowledged the role literature read during the developmental years 
has for the moral character of the children, irrespective of whether the reading is accompanied by any 
explicit instruction on morals. The pioneering character educator Thomas Lickona (“What” 247) also 
notes that literature has a special place in moral education as it can bring about “a felt sense of right 
and wrong” in the children. Different strands of moral education are not equally suited for considering 
children’s literature as moral education, however. Carr argues that what is needed is a framework that 
does “appropriate justice to the moral interplay of […] reason and emotion”, as literature is likely to 
challenge both the head and the heart (“Contribution” 137). In light of the holistic view of morality 
in Character Education mentioned above that pays attention to both moral knowledge and emotions, 
it seems that Character Education fits well with the particular features of children’s literature in moral 
education. 
The role of narrative fiction in ethics has been emphasized particularly by Martha C. Nussbaum. 
Nussbaum’s basic argument can be summed up in the notion that “narrative articulates the 
complexities of moral life in more fruitful ways than the abstract theorizing characteristic of 
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philosophy” (Brady 581). Consequently, narrative fiction has a special place in ethics that cannot be 
replaced by anything else, as Nussbaum argues that “certain truths about human life can only be 
fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist” (5). 
Nussbaum’s notions reflect an older view of fiction as the highest form of moral education. In this 
tradition, the medieval poet Sir Philip Sidney, for instance, considered fiction as ethically superior to 
philosophy, as it is able to combine moral precepts with concrete examples (Potolsky 65). This idea 
of the unique ethical properties of fiction appears to be also present in Character Education, as 
Lickona remarks, 
We can talk to children in abstract terms about deceit and hatred and loyalty and love, but 
when they come face to face with those qualities enfleshed in unforgettable characters, 
like the Wicked White Witch and the great and gentle Aslan in The Chronicles of Narnia, 
they feel repelled by the evil and are drawn, irresistibly, to the good. (“What” 247) 
 
It is interesting that Lickona chooses to use The Chronicles of Narnia as an example of the ability of 
literature to transmit moral values, which adds to the anecdotal evidence of the series’ effectiveness 
in bringing about moral changes in the readers. 
While Nussbaum’s position deals with narrative fiction in general, children’s literature appears 
to be especially connected to the idea of literature as conveying moral values. This is because 
children’s literature is “more educational, instructive, and intentional” than general fiction 
(Nikolajeva, “Children’s Literature” 313). While mainstream literature is categorized according to 
different literary epochs such as Romanticism and Enlightenment, the history of children’s literature 
is “instead related to pedagogical views and has oscillated between two extremes: education and 
pleasure (315). Jan Susina also notes that the “twin purposes of instruction and delight have long been 
accepted as the primary goals of children’s literature” (178).  
As Lewis’s children’s series is sometimes seen negatively as too didactic a series, it is 
worthwhile to consider further the “twin purposes” of instruction and pleasure and their connotations 
in children’s literature. The general idea is that children’s literature used to be highly didactic, but in 
modernity it has moved away from its didactic past and reached a more aesthetic form (see, for 
instance, Trousdale 1227–28; Susina 179–82). Children’s authors such as Edward Lear and Lewis 
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Carroll are often viewed as the first writers of aesthetic children’s literature (Trousdale 1228; Nelson 
14; Susina 182), and David Rudd (4) notes that some one-sided historical accounts even consider the 
time they started writing as the beginning of “proper” children’s literature, ruling out the didactic 
phase of the past altogether. Since the middle of the 20th century, didacticism in children’s literature 
has been on the decrease to the extent that that today most books written for a child readership attempt 
to avoid didacticism of any kind (Trousdale 1228–29). In mainstream children’s books today, then, 
if matters of morality ever need to be taken up, they are often in the form of questions (1228–29), and 
Claudia Nelson (15) even points out that “overt didacticism is now often seen as an artistic flaw.” 
The idea of didacticism as belonging to the past is relevant for consideration of The Chronicles 
of Narnia as children’s literature, as The Chronicles is often considered a particularly didactic 
children’s book when considered against the time of its publication. Thus, Mynott (40) notes that “the 
didactic narrative of Lewis’s text may well have seemed a bit ‘old fashioned’ when The Lion, the 
Witch and the Wardrobe was published in 1950.” Consequently, according to the narrative that 
didacticism in children’s literature belongs to the manipulative past (and that modern children’s 
literature ought to be free from it), the didactic elements in Lewis’s children’s novels are likely to be 
viewed in a negative light. 
The generalized historical shift from instruction to pleasure is not as simple as many accounts 
imply, nonetheless. Firstly, the situation today is often exaggerated, as the publishing of children’s 
literature with special focus to educate morally or religiously is strong even in the present age (Rudd 
4; Grenby and Immel xv). The two elements need not be mutually exclusive, either. Nikolajeva notes 
that “we intuitively recognize as the best children’s books” the ones that reconcile both didacticism 
and aesthetics (“Children’s Literature” 315). Most importantly, it can be argued that all narrative 
writing is didactic (Booth 151–52). Charles Sarland (57) agrees on this position by writing that “all 
writing is ideological since all writing either assumes values even when not overtly espousing them.” 
Thus, while it might be a helpful generalization in some respects to say that children’s literature has 
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shifted from didacticism towards aesthetics, the real change appears to have been in the quality of 
didacticism rather than in kind. 
Considering The Chronicles of Narnia, there also appear to be two kinds of opinions when it 
comes to their didacticism. While most scholars would perhaps agree with Naomi Lewis (582) that 
the Narnia series is “morally and theologically didactic”, there are others who do not hold the same 
opinion. Francisca Goldsmith, for instance, argues that Lewis influences the readers “without 
didacticism” (479). Perhaps the difference in the opinions lies in the degree of didacticism attached 
to the series: Goldsmith probably agrees that The Chronicles is didactic in a sense, but not to the 
degree that it would disturb one’s pleasure in reading the series. This idea is also present in Lewis’s 
thinking, as he opines in one of his personal letters that “art can teach […] without at all ceasing to 
be art” (“To I. O. Evans” 918). 
While The Chronicles gives critics somewhat mixed feelings concerning didacticism, explicit 
didacticism can be seen to have certain advantages over implicit didacticism, contrary to the common 
opinion. In a theory chapter on the ancient Greek literary concepts of mimesis (showing) and diegesis 
(telling), Herman Rapaport quotes an extract from Milton where the Devil is described in a highly 
diagetical way, as “the narrator is attempting to prejudice the reader, so that he or she won’t 
sympathize with a character who is the epitome of sinful pride” (74). It is difficult to dispute that such 
writing is clearly guiding the reading experience, but so are all other forms of writing. Rapaport (74–
75) notes that “there is the argument to be made that since the diegesis is more or less revealing 
prejudices […] that it’s more transparent and honest than mimesis, in which so much is implied and 
concealed.” In the light of this argument, criticisms of the didactic nature of The Chronicles could be 
answered by noting that at least Lewis is being open about the values he is promoting. 
In light of the remarks on the didacticism of the Narnia novels, it is perhaps quite surprising 
that Lewis himself denies that he first had a Christian or a moral message in mind and then worked 
out a children’s story to promote the ideas. In fact, Lewis claims that he “never started from a message 
or moral” in writing any of his works of fiction (“Unreal Estates” 123). In the case of Narnia, 
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“everything began with images; a faun carrying an umbrella, a queen on a sledge, a magnificent lion” 
– with no religious or moral meaning assigned to them (Lewis, “Sometimes” 119). 
Nevertheless, this is not to claim that Lewis was not intentional about the message of the stories. 
Anacker (131) notes that, although Lewis claims that the stories began with the pictures, those 
pictures were “harnessed for a purpose.” Lewis himself admits that after connecting the images and 
choosing the genre he did start to pay attention to what the message of the series was (“Sometimes” 
119). As far as morality is concerned, Lewis notes that the children’s author ought not to ask what 
morals are good for the children, but “What moral do I need” (“On Three Ways” 105), as the “only 
moral that is of any value is that which arises inevitably from the whole cast of the author’s mind” 
(106). This idea that the morals of the story (ought to) stem from the author’s mind probably explains 
the fact that The Chronicles of Narnia portrays many of Lewis’s moral philosophical ideas, which 
are considered in the following chapter. 
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3 Theory: C. S. Lewis and Moral Judgment 
This chapter sets out to discuss the moral philosophical lens that informs the following analysis on 
moral judgment in The Chronicles of Narnia. As the concept of moral judgment takes on different 
meaning in different moral philosophies, it will be viewed from a viewpoint relevant to C. S. Lewis 
and the present thesis. 
The chapter unfolds, firstly, by considering C. S. Lewis’s moral philosophy. Lewis’s most 
pertinent stance on ethics is seen in the Natural Law tradition, which he defended in many of his 
writings, and he also came up with his own version of Natural Law that is relevant for The Chronicles 
and the portrayal of moral judgment in it as will be argued below. Furthermore, Lewis subscribed to 
a certain kind of Virtue Ethics, which also has bearings on the Narnian portrayal of moral judgment 
and which will be addressed, too. Lastly, Lewis’s concept of moral discernment will be discussed, to 
the extent it is relevant for understanding the phenomenon of moral judgment in The Chronicles. 
3.1 Lewis’s Moral Philosophy 
This chapter discusses C. S. Lewis’s moral philosophy in general terms, with a special emphasis on 
the elements that are relevant for The Chronicles of Narnia and the focus of the present thesis on 
moral judgment. In personal correspondence, Lewis noted that his primary authority on ethics was 
Aristotle (“To Corbin Scott Carnell” 979). While it is not in the scope of this study to analyze in detail 
how Lewis was indebted to Aristotle, Lewis’s debt to classical philosophers like Aristotle will be 
here seen in two broad moral philosophical traditions, the Natural Law theory and Virtue Ethics, both 
of which are visible in Lewis’s philosophy and The Chronicles. The chapter begins by discussing the 
Natural Law theory, as it has more prominence in Lewis’s non-fiction, followed by a brief 
consideration of Virtue Ethics. 
It was noted above that modern character educators generally believe in objective moral truth 
(see Arthur, Education 115; Lickona, “Character Education” 77; Pike et al. 71; Kristjánsson 138). 
How does one argue for such a position? C. S. Lewis was convinced that the moral reality is best 
explained by the Natural Law theory, which represents a traditional and probably the most elaborate 
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account of objective morality. Lewis came up with his own version of the theory and called it the 
“Tao” (Abolition 701). Understanding Lewis’s Tao and the Natural Law tradition behind it is relevant 
for the present study for multiple reasons. First of all, the connection between Lewis’s Tao and The 
Chronicles of Narnia is widely attested. For instance, Pike et al. studied the first three books in the 
series and found that they depicted “12 universal virtues consistent with the Tao” (77) and Tim 
Mosteller writes that the “Tao of Narnia is what philosophers and theologians call Natural Law” (95). 
Secondly, character educators Pike et al. “make the case for the objective reality of Lewis’s Tao” and 
note that it is “congruent with contemporary discussions of character education” (Pike et al. 71–72). 
Moreover, the Natural Law tradition informs Lewis’s understanding of moral judgment to a large 
extent, which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
What is meant by Natural Law, then? Charles E. Curran notes that Natural Law theories are a 
set of “ethical theories that determine what is right or wrong on the basis of the common humanity 
that all human beings share” (594). As a term, Natural Law might be misleading, however, “for it 
does not refer to laws of nature as the phrase is used today – that is, to scientific laws” (Christopher). 
The Natural Law is different from these other kinds of natural law, for instance, in that people can 
decide whether to follow its promptings or not (Schneewind 520; Lewis, Mere Christianity 16). While 
Natural Law is the established term when discussing the tradition itself, there are other names 
available for the concept of a universal ethical law that avoid confusion with the popular 
understanding of a “natural law”. One of the most understandable terms is probably “Moral Law”, 
which is also used by Lewis (Mere Christianity 27). In this study, therefore, when discussing the 
actual tradition, the term “Natural Law” will be used, but when talking about the phenomenon itself, 
the suggested reality behind the theory, “Moral Law” will be preferred instead. 
The Moral Law is a common topic in the bibliography of C. S. Lewis. Here the emphasis will 
be especially on The Abolition of Man (1943), which is taken to be among Lewis’s most important 
philosophical treatises (Schakel 165; Ojala and Saarinen 119). The Abolition of Man includes not 
only Lewis’s broadest and most elaborate account of the Moral Law, but it is also – more importantly 
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for the present research – the only one to specifically focus on educational philosophy. In The 
Abolition, Lewis drafts his understanding of the “Tao” – “the doctrine of objective value, the belief 
that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the 
kind of things we are” (Abolition 701). 
The most important way in which individual Natural Law theories differ from each other are 
their actual lists of virtues or basic moral knowledge that are thought to form the Moral Law (Curran 
594). In like manner, Lewis also attempted to compile a possible list of such values, although he 
added that “[t]he list makes no pretence of completeness” (Abolition 731). The laws are probably not 
as unique as the method of how Lewis compiled the list: Lewis’s way for illustrating the Moral Law 
was through a study of literatures of ancient cultures by referring to multiple sources such as the 
Greek philosophers, early Hinduism, Taoism, and Jewish thought. (Hence the name Tao, which could 
have also been any of the other ancient concepts for the phenomenon.) He observed certain 
similarities in all the ancient texts and came up with a list of eight universal Laws of the Tao, and 
included the list as an appendix in The Abolition of Man (1943). The list is presented in an abbreviated 
form below. 
The Laws of the Tao Lewis’s Examples in Ancient Literatures 
1. The Law of General 
Beneficence 
“Never do to others what you would not like them to do to you.” 
(Ancient Chinese, Analects) 
 
“Do to men what you wish men to do to you.” (Christian, 
Matthew 7:12) 
2. The Law of Special 
Beneficence 
“Has he insulted his elder sister?” (Babylonian, List of Sins) 
 
“Natural affection is a thing right and according to Nature.” 
(Greek) 
3. Duties to Parents, 
Elders, Ancestors 
“Children, old men, the poor, and the sick, should be considered 
as the lords of the atmosphere.” (Hindu, Janet) 
 
“I tended the old man, I gave him my staff.” (Ancient Egyptian) 
4. Duties to Children 
and Posterity 
“To marry and to beget children.” (Greek, List of Duties) 
 
“The Master said, Respect the young.” (Ancient Chinese, 
Analects) 
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5. The Law of Justice “Thou shalt not commit adultery.” (Ancient Jewish, Exodus 
20:14) 
 
“Justice is the settled and permanent intention of rendering to 
each man his rights.” (Roman, Justinian, Institutions) 
6. The Law of Good 
Faith and Veracity 
“I sought no trickery, nor swore false oaths.” (Anglo-Saxon, 
Beowulf) 
 
“In Nástrond (= Hell) I saw the perjurers.” (Old Norse, Volospá) 
7. The Law of Mercy “In the Dalebura tribe a woman, a cripple from birth, was carried 
about by the tribespeople in turn until her death at the age of sixty-
six” … “They never desert the sick.” (Australian Aborigines) 
 
“Has he failed to set a prisoner free?” (Babylonian, List of Sins) 
8. The Law of 
Magnanimity 
“Praise and imitate that man to whom, while life is pleasing, 
death is not grievous.” (Stoic, Seneca) 
 
“The Master said, Love learning and if attacked be ready to die 
for the Good Way.” (Ancient Chinese, Analects) 
Table 1. “Illustrations of the Tao” in Lewis’s The Abolition of Man (731–38), Abbreviated. 
 
In his writings, Lewis emphasized the bearings that the Moral Law has for moral authorities. 
He argued that “[u]ntil quite modern times all teachers and even all men” believed in objective value 
statements (Abolition 699). In addition to believing in the Tao, in the old understanding of values, 
“both the kind of man the teachers wished to produce and their motives for producing him were 
prescribed by the Tao—a norm to which the teachers themselves were subjected and from which they 
claimed no liberty to depart” (721). Thus, Lewis argues that the Moral Law gave teachers the right to 
impose certain values on the learners, as they did not decide the values artificially but based their 
teaching on virtues that were thought to be part of humanity. In Lewis’s thinking, then, there is a 
Moral Law in the universe to which everyone has access and on which educators can ground their 
moral education. This idea is, of course, relevant for considerations of moral judgment: if there indeed 
exist objective values, then, in this view, judging well would mean judging in accordance with the 
universal morality. 
Apart from the Natural Law tradition as seen in the Tao, Lewis appears to have subscribed to a 
certain virtue-ethical understanding of morality that also informs his concept of moral judgment. This 
is relevant for both The Chronicles of Narnia and the character educational focus of the present study, 
21 
 
as they are both based on a virtue-ethical understanding of what it means to lead a good life. For 
instance, Anacker (140) argues that in the Narnia novels the “central focus of the stories is upon who 
we are as persons” and, consequently, Lewis’s children’s series “argues strongly that virtue ethics is 
the proper framework in which to do ethical theory.” Furthermore, as Kristjánsson (136) notes that, 
since character educators often speak about virtues in similar terms to virtue ethicists, the modern-
day Character Education seems to stem to some extent from the modern Virtue Ethics. Virtue Ethics 
is a multi-faceted strand of moral philosophy, yet it will be here discussed mostly in general terms, 
focusing on those aspects most relevant for the present analysis and especially for the concept of 
moral judgment in the Narnia novels.  
Perhaps the most defining element of Virtue Ethics – which is also the most relevant 
characteristic for the present study – lies in its primary focus on the moral agent instead of moral acts 
(Garcia 840; Louden 491; Bunnin and Yu 728). This distinguishes Virtue Ethics from the other two 
main strands of ethics, Kantianism and Consequentialism. While Kantianism attempts to define 
certain universal moral duties that ought to inform individual acts and a Consequentialist asks whether 
the consequences of a certain act are good or not, in Virtue Ethics, the primary ethical question is 
“What kind of person should I be?” (Bunnin and Yu 728; Arthur, Education 42). For C. S. Lewis, the 
effects on the moral agent clearly take primacy over the moral acts: “the truth is that right actions 
done for the wrong reason do not help to build the internal quality or character called a ‘virtue’, and 
it is this quality or character that really matters” (Mere Christianity 72). The same trait is also present 
in The Chronicles of Narnia (Anacker 140) and affects moral judgment to a great extent: in 
considerations of good and evil, one ought to pay attention primarily to the effects on one’s character. 
A second virtue-ethical notion that is especially relevant to The Chronicles is seen in the idea 
that a morally right action is commonly thought to be defined as what a virtuous character would do 
in a specific situation (Louden 495). An influential form of this virtue-ethical approach is seen in the 
Christian tradition of imitatio Christi, the imitation of Christ (Lawler and Salzman 465), to which 
Lewis also subscribed. Lewis interpreted that, for Christians, what it means to live a morally good 
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life is to follow the virtuous agent’s – the Christ’s – example. He writes, “For you are no longer 
thinking simply about right and wrong; you are trying to catch the good infection from a Person” 
(Mere Christianity 152). The idea of imitating the virtuous agent is central to understanding Narnian 
moral judgment with Aslan as the epitome of virtue that the protagonists imitate. 
Before moving on to considerations of moral judgment, it is worthwhile to ask, in light of the 
moral educational focus of the present research, whether Natural Law and Virtue Ethics are taken 
seriously by philosophers anymore, especially since they are age-old and appear to stand in contrast 
with many modern ideas on morality. Indeed, both traditions used to be the dominant alternatives in 
their respective areas of ethics until the Enlightenment. For instance, Curran notes that “[m]ost of the 
classical moral philosophers in the Western tradition adopted some sort of natural law theory” (594). 
Likewise, concerning Virtue Ethics, Robert B. Louden estimates that a certain form of virtue-ethical 
understanding of morality “represented the dominant outlook in both western and eastern schools of 
moral thought until the Enlightenment” (491). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that both traditions have 
been steadily on the rise after the publication of The Chronicles of Narnia. Tapio Puolimatka (14) 
notes that there has been a shift toward an acknowledgement of moral objectivism within moral 
philosophy in recent decades, and a part of that shift has been a reappraisal of the classical Natural 
Law tradition. Virtues Ethics has gained even more significant popularity after the publication of 
Lewis’s works, as Anacker, for example, calls the resurgence of Virtue Ethics as “one of the most 
remarkable developments in recent philosophy” (140). Consequently, the reappraisals of both Natural 
Law and Virtue Ethics appear to speak to their relevance as frameworks in contemporary moral 
education despite their antiquity. 
Based on this chapter, it appears that a general understanding of the moral philosophical 
traditions of Natural Law and Virtue Ethics provides common ground for discussions on C. S. Lewis, 
The Chronicles, and Character Education. In the following section, then, Lewis’s concept of moral 
judgment will be discussed, which is based on the two traditions discussed in this chapter. 
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3.2 Moral Judgment 
The previous section discussed the Natural Law theory and Virtue Ethics as the main theoretical 
traditions in understanding C. S. Lewis’s moral philosophy. While these traditions aid in 
understanding the nature of moral knowledge in general, there still remains the question of how one 
is to access such knowledge and discern between good and evil in practice. For this, what needs to be 
considered is the concept of moral judgment. Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu (446) give moral 
judgment two definitions. Firstly, it may mean the “content of a proposition that typically 
discriminates between good or bad or between right and wrong and determines what should be done 
in a moral context.” Secondly, it may mean “the capacity to make such judgments or to make them 
well” (Bunnin and Yu 446). Here, moral judgment will be considered as one’s “capacity to judge 
well” (in the second sense given by Bunnin and Yu). As one’s standpoint in moral philosophy affects 
one’s understanding of moral judgment to a large extent, what is meant by “judging well” in this 
context is judging correctly in the light of Moral Law and Virtue Ethics. 
What are the capacities a human being has for moral judgment? Different periods and traditions 
have given different answers to the question. For instance, throughout the 20th century, moral 
judgment was understood primarily as a rational and conscious capacity seen in forms of moral 
reasoning (Mercier 131). Lately, empirical studies in moral psychology have suggested that, instead, 
intuition and emotion play a larger role in actual instances of moral judgment (132). C. S. Lewis’s 
non-fiction and The Chronicles of Narnia emphasize the conscious aspects of moral judgment such 
as moral reasoning. In addition, intuition2 plays an important role, too, as will be discussed below. 
Emotions, however, are not portrayed at all as a capacity of judgment. This is probably because in 
Lewis’s thinking emotions are subjected to reasoning: 
No emotion is, in itself, a judgement; in that sense all emotions and sentiments are 
alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to 
conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it. 
(Abolition 702) 
                                                 
2 Without lingering on the topic, it will be here noted that Lewis’s understanding of intuition differs from the way modern 
moral psychologists use the term. For Lewis, intuition accounts for one’s awareness of the basic principles from which 
conscious moral conclusions are inferred (as observed below), while the psychologists tend to treat it as an alternative to 
conscious moral reasoning (see Haidt, for instance). 
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As Lewis did not consider emotions as a source of moral truth, the present study leaves out detailed 
considerations of moral emotion and, instead, focuses on reasoning and intuition as one’s primary 
capacities for (correct) judgment. This is not to say that Lewis would have dismissed the critical effect 
of emotions on good judgment, however. In fact, Lewis himself noted that “the task of the modern 
educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts”, by which he meant encouraging good 
emotions or “just sentiments” (Abolition 699; see Pelser 12–22 for a larger account of Lewis’s 
understanding of moral emotions). However important a role emotions play in judgment as a 
motivational force, in Lewis’s view they are not necessarily shaped or governed by the Moral Law. 
Therefore, emotions ought not to be taken as a standard of judgment but, instead, they need to be 
trained in the right direction in accordance with one’s understanding of the Law. 
Lewis wrote on aspects of moral judgment in a wide array of essays and books, but the clearest 
outline of his thought on the subject can be seen in the essay “Why I Am Not a Pacifist”, in which 
Lewis first attempts to answer the “general question: how do we decide what is good or evil?” (281) 
and then applies it to the specific case of pacifism. In the essay, Lewis gives three ways of correcting 
mistakes in our sense of right and wrong: Reason, Conscience, and Authority (“Why” 281–83). It 
will be argued in this study that these three also represent, essentially, the forms of moral judgment 
portrayed in The Chronicles. In the following subchapters, then, these three concepts will be 
discussed in the aforementioned order. 
3.2.1 Judgments of Fact: Theoretical Reason 
Lewis begins his treatment of moral judgment by illustrating the concept of “Reason”, which he 
defines as “the whole man judging” about “truth and falsehood” (“Why” 281). By “Reason” Lewis 
means the Aristotelian concept of “Theoretical Reason”, which he defines as “the connecting by 
inference of propositions, ultimately derived from sense data, with further propositions” (Abolition 
707). This kind of reasoning is essentially deductive reasoning, which is understood to lie behind the 
Natural Law theory, Kohlbergianism and ancient philosophers’ theories (Harman et al. 241). 
Deductive reasoning is based on logical inferences from premises to a conclusion, valid reasoning 
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meaning that “it is impossible to assert the premises and deny the conclusion without contradiction” 
(Colman). Deductive reasoning about truth and falsehood will be referred to in this study as 
“Theoretical Reason” or “Logic”, the latter being the Narnian term for the concept, introduced in The 
Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (131). 
In order for logical reasoning to be sound, it needs to follow the laws of logic. Lewis demanded 
that any theory of knowledge would have to admit this: “you reach a self-contradiction if you say that 
logical inference is, in principle, invalid” (“De Futilitate” 270). This is because, a theory “which 
explained everything else in the whole universe but which made it impossible to believe that our 
thinking was valid […] would itself have been reached by thinking” and thereby contradict itself 
(Miracles 313). Consequently, if one is to say anything that claims any truth value, one needs to 
believe in the basic laws of logic such as the validity of inference. 
Lewis’s idea of the irrefutable basic principles of logic stems from the Aristotelian concept of 
the First Principles of Theoretical Reason. Lewis believed that these First Principles (the laws of 
logic) are innately available in human beings and accessible through intuition, which he defines as 
“the mind perceiving self-evident truth” (“Why 282”). Awareness of the laws does not mean that all 
human communication would be sound, however. There is an important difference to be made 
between the First Principles (that are objectively true) and the actual conclusions arrived at through 
inference. As human thinking is prone to error, one is “driven to combine a steadfast faith in inference 
as such with a wholesome skepticism about each particular instance of inference in the mind of a 
human thinker” (“De Futilitate” 270). 
If it is true that human beings are innately aware of the objective principles concerning logical 
thought, then it implies that logical reasoning may arrive at objective truth, provided that the 
deduction arrives truthfully from the First Principles. But how is it connected to moral judgment? 
After all, Lewis notices that Theoretical Reason cannot judge whether something is good or evil, but 
only whether a statement is true or false (“Why” 281). (The argument that one ought to be truthful is 
a moral judgment that cannot be deduced from the First Principles of Theoretical Reason.) Lewis 
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believed that there were other human capacities needed for making judgments of value, and these will 
be considered next. 
3.2.2 Judgments of Value: Conscientia and Practical Reason 
Turning to judgments of value, Lewis notes that the “usual answer is that we decide by conscience” 
(“Why” 281). Lewis agrees with this position, although his concept of the conscience differs from 
the popular account. In Lewis’s understanding, conscience has two meanings: “(a) the pressure a man 
feels upon his will to do what he thinks is right; (b) his judgement as to what the content of right and 
wrong are” (281). Similar division is adopted by the character educator Thomas Lickona (“What” 
246) who differentiates between the emotional and cognitive senses of the conscience, comparable to 
Lewis’s senses (a) and (b), respectively. As is the case with many of his ethical concepts, Lewis draws 
his understanding of the conscience from traditional sources. The clearest accounts of the conscience 
in the Lewis corpus are seen in his historical study of the words Conscience and Conscious (Studies 
181–213). To avoid confusion with the terms, the emotional side of conscience in sense (a) is here 
called Conscientia (the Latin name for the concept), while the cognitive understanding of conscience 
in sense (b) will be referred to as Practical Reason, which is what Lewis means with the term. Both 
senses of the conscience occur in The Chronicles of Narnia, but as Conscientia does not have a 
significant role in Lewis’s theory nor in The Chronicles, it will be only dealt with briefly. 
Concerning Conscientia, Lewis writes that its basic function is to bear “witness to the fact, say, 
that we committed a murder” (Studies 190). Lewis held an unwavering opinion that Conscientia is 
“not to be argued with, but obeyed” (“Why” 281). However, as Conscientia is simply “always to be 
followed”, Lewis does not seem to devote much space to it as regards moral judgment (281). 
Although Conscientia binds one to act according to one’s sense of right and wrong, it does not itself 
tell what right and wrong are, however, but “we are supposed to know that in some other way” 
(Studies 190). 
Lewis notes that this other element of the conscience in sense (b) – knowing what is good and 
evil – has different names in alternative traditions such as “practical reason, moral sense, reflection, 
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the Categorical Imperative, or the super-ego” (Studies 194). Out of these, Lewis finds the Aristotelian 
concept of Practical Reason the most useful, as Lewis believed that Reason is the capacity utilized, 
not only in judgments of fact, but also in value judgments (Miracles 331). Though substantively 
similar, the essential difference between Theoretical and Practical Reason is that, while Theoretical 
Reason is based ultimately on the laws of logic, Practical Reason draws on the “First Principles of 
Practical Reason,” that is, the universal principles of morality. 
According to Lewis, just as one perceives the laws of logic innately, one also understands the 
“First Principles” of morality by intuition: 
We “just see” that there is no reason why my neighbour’s happiness should be sacrificed 
to my own, as we “just see” that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to 
another. If we cannot prove either axiom, that is not because they are irrational but 
because they are self-evident and all proofs depend on them. (Miracles 331) 
 
In the example, justice (rendering to each their due; in this context to the neighbor) is given as a moral 
intuition that one “just sees”. For Lewis, such “First Principles of Practical Reason” equal to the Laws 
of the Tao: they are the premises that (correct) value judgments rests upon (Abolition 712). Lewis 
gave an example of how one can deduce other moral judgments from these basic principles: “our duty 
to do good to all men is an axiom of Practical Reason, and our duty to do good to our descendants is 
a clear deduction from it” (Abolition 713). Lewis’s example could be written as follows, 
1. One ought to do good to all men. (a Law of the Tao, intuitively “just seen”) 
2. Our descendants are men. 
3. Therefore, one ought to do good to one’s descendants.3 
 
This example shows that one can draw more specific moral principles from the first principles by the 
way of logical deduction. 
Finally, it seems that Lewis did not want to over-emphasize the difference between the concepts 
of Theoretical and Practical Reason. After all, the main difference between Theoretical and Practical 
Reason are the different “first principles” on which they are based that also explain the different 
                                                 
3 Lewis’s example appears not to have been well thought out in light of his own theory, however. The resulting “duty to 
do good to our descendants” (Abolition 713) is almost identical with the “Law of Special Beneficence” (733), so 
apparently it ought to be “just seen” like the “Law of General Beneficence” (731), from which it was deduced. 
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conclusions. Maybe for this reason, Lewis sometimes speaks of the two together as simply “Reason”. 
For instance, in The Abolition Lewis notes that we need to “extend the word Reason to include what 
our ancestors called Practical Reason” (707). This is relevant for considering the portrayal of the two 
kinds of reasoning in Narnia: it will be observed in the analysis that, although the children are trained 
in Logic and learning to discern the moral intuitions separately, the two forms of reasoning most often 
work together. For Lewis, then, once the different capacities have been introduced, Reason means 
logical reasoning based on inference about both scientific and moral matters.4 
Before moving on, a few critical remarks are due concerning the scientific credibility of the 
concept of Practical Reason. At first glance, the concept appears to have a clear advantage in moral 
philosophy, as it seems to account for the “is–ought fallacy” – the basic question in moral philosophy 
of “how, if at all, we can legitimately move from is to ought, from describing how things do in fact 
stand, to expressing an urgent concern either that they be changed or that they be respected, preserved 
as they are” (Hepburn 446, emphases in original). Lewis agrees that “[f]rom propositions about fact 
alone no practical conclusion can ever be drawn” (Abolition 707, emphasis in original). Logic is only 
concerned with truth and falsehood: strictly speaking, the finding that a man has stolen an item does 
not yet help determine whether he ought to have done otherwise. If Lewis’s account holds true, 
however, the is–ought fallacy does not concern it, as it is believed that “Reason can be practical” 
(712), meaning that Reason has access to the first principles of morality that are themselves 
undeniable. In that case, one can progress from a premised “ought” to another “ought” by inference: 
if one knows innately that lying is wrong and catches a friend in the act of theft, then one can condemn 
the act as morally wrong. 
While the idea of the First Principles accounts for the is–ought fallacy, Lewis himself admits 
that the First Principles themselves do not “admit proof”, however (Abolition 712). This problem 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, Lewis’s emphasis on the role of reasoning in acquiring true knowledge of the world appears to even have 
included the aesthetic: “We must, then, grant logic to the reality; we must, if we are to have any moral standards, grant it 
moral standards too. And there is really no reason why our reaction to a beautiful landscape should not be the response, 
however humanly blurred and partial, to a something that is really there” (“De Futilitate” 273). This aspect is also present 
in The Abolition and has recently gained interest (Pelser 12–22) but is not relevant for moral judgment, nevertheless. 
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probably lies behind Lewis’s attempt to illustrate the theory with observation from different cultures, 
as seen in the theory of the Tao, instead of proving it: 
I am not trying to provide [the Tao’s] validity from common consent. Its validity cannot 
be deduced. For those who do not perceive its rationality, even universal consent could 
not prove it. (Abolition 731; emphasis in original) 
 
This, in turn, is a serious lack from a scientific point of view. As Lewis presumes that people see the 
rationality of the idea, the strength of the theory seems to rest on its claimed “explanatory power” 
rather than any strictly scientific observation. (Lewis would probably have added, though, that the 
strictly scientific methods are themselves based on intuitions of logic “just seen” similar to moral 
intuitions.) 
Generally speaking, then, there are two means of moral judgment that Lewis deems objective 
in light of the Moral Law: intuitive knowledge of the first principles of morality and inference from 
them based on the laws of logic. In Lewis’s thinking, there is also a third way that does not follow as 
directly from the Moral Law, which will be discussed in the remaining section. 
3.2.3 Authority and Moral Imitation 
Apart from Theoretical and Practical Reason, Lewis notes that authority “also has to be frequently 
used instead of reasoning itself as a method of getting conclusions” (“Why” 282). According to 
Lewis, it is right (and necessary, as otherwise “we should have to live like savages”) to consult an 
authority “if the man has good reason to believe the authority wiser and better than himself” (283). 
Authority may take multiple forms, but when it comes to Narnia, there is a special kind of “authority 
as a substitute for argument” (“Why” 283) that is especially relevant to the children’s series. This is 
seen in the way the protagonists imitate Aslan and other virtuous characters in the novels. Behind this 
lies the Christian idea of imitatio Christi and the virtue-ethical emphasis on imitation in general, as 
Aristotle noted that the primary way of judging between good and evil is following the example of a 
virtuous character (Dunne 55; Carr and Steutel 9). 
The role of imitation has a long tradition in considerations of moral judgment when it comes to 
a work of narrative fiction such as The Chronicles. Potolsky (50) notes that “following the best human 
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role models and imitating trusted conventions” used to be thought as one of the main functions of 
literature in general from the ancient Rome to the early modern era. Potolsky specifically mentions 
the ideas of the medieval scholar Sir Philip Sidney, who, following the Aristotelian idea, thought that 
“the power of fiction to offer noble models of conduct makes it the highest form of teaching” as 
imitation allows the author to provide “forceful images of virtue and vice, moving the reader to self-
improvement” (65). Although Potolsky notes that such a view of literature receded drastically by the 
end of the eighteenth century (65), there have been new attempts to restore it. Wayne Booth (254–
55), for one, asserts that, in creating morally virtuous characters, real authors are able to come up 
with characters that are essentially more virtuous than themselves, as their philosophical ideals of a 
virtuous person surpasses their own attempts to live out high morality. A real reader who surrenders 
to a text with such superior characters, then, finds himself “to some degree shaped into those patterns” 
(Booth 272). This is what Booth playfully calls “hypocrisy upward” in which the reader, although 
not as virtuous as the characters, takes on their superior roles and pretends to be like them, until the 
reader actually becomes more like them (272). The Chronicles appears to form a good example of 
literature that aims to bring about such change in the readers through imitation, considering the fact 
that Aslan is clearly intended as a role model for the Narnian children and the child readers (as argued 
in the analysis). 
Lastly, it is worth discussing whether imitation could be seen as another capacity of judgment 
in addition to the ones mentioned so far. It was stated above that Lewis identifies two capacities for 
judgment, reasoning and intuition, while emotions were not considered a form of judgment. Yet it 
may be reasonable to speak of imitation as using another capacity in addition to reasoning and 
intuition. While moral reasoning requires logical thinking, imitation could be seen to require 
primarily imagination, as the task is not to decide (by reasoning based on facts) what Aslan does in a 
situation but to find out (by the way of imagination) what he would do. Lewis explained the difference 
between the two conscious capacities by noting that “reason is the natural organ of truth, but 
imagination is the organ of meaning” (“Bluspes” 265). Peter J. Schakel interprets Lewis’s statement 
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to mean that imagination is needed “to give meaning to morality, to connect its principles to life, to 
bridge the gap between theory and practice” (164). In the present context, imagination renders one 
capable of picturing what a virtuous person would do in a given situation. Although imagination is 
clearly the capacity involved in moral imitation and thus relevant for the present study, it was 
purposely left out of the listing above as one of the primary capacities for moral judgment. This is 
because one needs to rely on one’s moral knowledge (gained by intuition and logic) about the moral 
justness of the person in question in order to truly trust their moral authority. It is, consequently, 
rather the capacity utilized for the particular form of authority. Other forms of authority such as moral 
commandments in a sacred text may require different capacities.  
All of the aforementioned ways of moral judgment – Logic, Conscience, and Imitation – have 
a central role in The Chronicles of Narnia. They, together with the Moral Law and certain cultural 
elements in moral judgment, create the central aspects in the portrayal of moral judgment in the 
Narnia series, which will be studied in the following analysis. Before moving into the analysis, 
however, it is necessary to note at this point what is meant with the Narnia novels as Character 
Education in the present study.  
It has been observed in the present theory chapter that C. S. Lewis’s moral philosophy and The 
Chronicles of Narnia share a similar moral philosophical framework with the Character Education 
movement. This framework is seen in the present study broadly as a belief in objective morality and 
a general virtue-ethical understanding of morality, comparable roughly to the classical traditions of 
Natural Law and Virtue Ethics, respectively. Moreover, the present section shows that Lewis’s 
understanding of moral judgment (both in his non-fiction and The Chronicles) is drawn coherently 
from the same framework. Consequently, it is here suggested that the portrayal of moral judgment in 
The Chronicles is “character educational” to the extent it flows from the philosophical beliefs behind 
Character Education. Moreover, according to the Aristotelian view of the moral function of literature, 
narrative fiction could be seen as a prime means for such moral education. The following analysis on 
the portrayal of moral judgment in The Chronicles, then, on one hand, studies the phenomenon of 
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moral judgment in the series and, on the other hand, reveals interesting insights into the character 
educational function of the novels. 
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4 Analysis: Moral Judgment in The Chronicles of Narnia 
Moral judgment in the Narnia novels is a broad and multifaceted phenomenon. There are at least three 
levels at which the reader encounters portrayal of judgment between right and wrong, good and evil 
in The Chronicles. At the deepest level, considerations of moral judgment begin from general beliefs 
about morality, without which there are no notions of good and evil. Secondly, the actual instances 
of judgment by the characters reveal how one is able to judge morally. Thirdly, The Chronicles of 
Narnia comments on a number of cultural aspects of judgment such as the roles that education and 
literature play in moral judgment. 
This analysis sets out to analyze judgment in the Narnia series at all of the aforementioned 
levels. The analysis unfolds as follows: The first section analyzes the basic beliefs concerning 
morality in Narnia. It will be argued that these beliefs are illustrated in the “Deep Magic”, the Narnian 
concept of the universal Moral Law, which is communicated to the reader largely through didactic 
narration. The second chapter pays attention to the general elements of Narnian moral judgment, 
based on an analysis of the characters’ practices in moral judgment. The basic elements will be seen 
in the concepts of Logic, Conscience, and Imitation. Lastly, a few cultural aspects in Narnian moral 
judgment will be studied, namely upbringing, education, the moral beliefs of a society, and the use 
of literature in moral arguments. All of these different elements, then, will shed light on the overall 
sense of how judgment between good and evil, right and wrong is portrayed in The Chronicles of 
Narnia. 
4.1 Moral Framework of Narnia: “Deep Magic” and Didactic Narrator 
Behind any practice of moral judgment lies one’s beliefs about the concepts of good and evil. It has 
been observed that in Narnia there is a belief in objective good and evil, the “Tao of Narnia” 
(Mosteller 95). In this section, the analysis will focus on studying the Tao, the Moral Law, in Narnia 
and on considering its role in the portrayal of moral judgment in Narnia. What will be proposed here 
is that, while explicit instances of the Moral Law are few in the Chronicles, the presence of Tao that 
appears to permeate the series is largely due to the didactic narrator, who interprets everything to the 
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reader from an essentially Moral Law perspective. Finally, some pedagogical implications of the 
didactic narrator are considered. 
As noted above, Lewis understood the basic principles of morality to stem from a law of nature 
that people are inherently aware of. Abstract and theoretical concepts such as the laws of nature are 
seldom brought to the fore in fiction, however, which probably explains the fact that, although many 
critics talk about the Moral Law in Narnia, there are few explicit illustrations of it. Nevertheless, there 
appears to be a single scene in Narnia that explicitly mentions the Moral Law. Schakel (166, 176) 
notes that the Tao can be found in the concept of “Deep Magic” in The Lion, the Witch and the 
Wardrobe (hence, LWW). The only explicit descriptions of the “Deep Magic” appear when Aslan 
bids the Witch to tell him and the others of the Deep Magic. She replies, 
“Tell you what is written on the very Table of Stone which stands beside us? Tell you 
what is written in letters deep as a spear is long on the fire-stones on the Secret Hill? Tell 
you what is engraved on the sceptre of the Emperor-beyond-the-Sea? You at least know 
the Magic which the Emperor put into Narnia at the very beginning. You know that every 
traitor belongs to me as my lawful prey and that for every treachery I have a right to kill.” 
(LWW 175) 
 
There are several good reasons to identify this description of the “Deep Magic” as Lewis’s Narnian 
version of the Moral Law. For example, the “Table of Stone” (LWW 175) clearly recalls Moses’ 
“Tablets of Stone”, a fact which Lewis also admits in one of his letters: “the stone table is meant to 
remind one of Moses’ table” (“To Patricia Mackey” 1157; emphasis in original). This points towards 
the Moral Law, as the Tablets of Stone contained the Ten Commandments – a set of moral principles 
quite like the Laws of the Tao. Lewis himself included parts of the Ten Commandments in his 
“Illustrations of the Tao” (Abolition 731–38), and thus believed that they were (at least partly) 
included in the Tao. The contents of the Deep Magic (written on the Stone Table) are not given 
explicitly, but at least one aspect is revealed: it contains moral obligations to punish wicked deeds, as 
suggested by the Witch’s demand for the blood of traitors based on it (LWW 175). This aspect also 
suggests that it could be interpreted as the Moral Law. Finally, the Witch once refers to the Deep 
Magic as “the Law” (LWW 176), which makes it clear that the Deep Magic is not “magic” in the 
original sense of the word but rather a Law containing binding moral commandments. These 
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examples will suffice to draw the apparent connection between Lewis’s theory of the Tao and the 
Narnian Deep Magic. 
The explicit passage on the “Deep Magic” gives the impression that the Moral Law is somehow 
woven into the fabric of the universe, as seen in the Witch’s notion that the Emperor put the Magic 
“into Narnia at the very beginning” (LWW 175). This is in agreement with Lewis’s actual beliefs 
about the Moral Law, which he linked to the concept of Reason. Lewis writes that Reason “exists 
absolutely on its own”, outside the human mind and irrespective of whether human beings are rational 
or not (Miracles 325). He argues for his position by noting that, “Unless all that we take to be 
knowledge is an illusion, we must hold that in thinking we are not reading rationality into an irrational 
universe but responding to a rationality with which the universe has always been saturated” (“De 
Futilitate” 268). As Lewis’s Reason includes Practical Reason (and with it, judgments of value), this 
“Reason” contains the Moral Law, too. Lewis notes that if one is to believe in objective value 
judgments, then “the Reason in which the universe is saturated is also moral” (“De Futilitate” 270). 
What such a depiction of the Deep Magic suggests is that moral values in Narnia are not arbitrary and 
subjective but rather have a real moral standard, built into the very fabric of the universe. 
On the other hand, the implied author (the author revealed by the text) of the Narnia novels 
makes it plain that the Moral Law, or the Deep Magic, exists within the characters, too, as they are 
depicted as having an inherent knowledge of good and evil. For instance, when Edmund is about to 
lead his siblings to the White Witch, the narrator notes that he “managed to believe – or to pretend he 
believed” (LWW 151) that the Witch would not be excessively evil towards them. The narrator then 
reveals why Edmund cannot excuse his wicked idea: “deep down inside him he really knew that the 
White Witch was bad and cruel” (LWW 152). The “Deep Magic” is here portrayed as something that 
one cannot escape: even a wicked person knows ultimately what is good and evil, and is therefore 
held morally accountable. That the objective moral principles are portrayed as being “deep down 
inside” the character neatly conveys the narrator’s idea of the Deep Magic as located “deep down” in 
a person’s soul innermost being. This is, again, in line with Lewis’s philosophical notion that the 
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Reason (which contains the basic moral principles) exists in the universe on its own but at the same 
time within a human mind: the universal Reason is “the source of my own imperfect and intermittent 
rationality” (Miracles 325) and the “power” employed in moral judgment is Reason (331). 
From these observations of the Moral Law it can be inferred that moral judgment in Narnia is 
shown as having an objective basis. In addition, Lewis clearly intended the moral universe of Narnia 
to be similar to what he believed was true of the actual world: there is “a real Right and Wrong” 
(Mere Christianity 17). Explicit illustrations of the Moral Law in Narnia are rare and do not account 
for the anecdotal evidence of the presence of the Tao that permeates the series as a whole, however. 
What could account for the presence of Moral Law on the surface level in Narnia, by contrast, is the 
firm belief in objective morality that is present in the moral judgments by the narrator. Unwavering 
judgments on the morality of the acts and characters in Narnia work to assert the idea of objective 
morality implicitly. 
Mynott writes that “Lewis provides his readers with a wise adult narrator who guides them 
through the story” (40). The reader can trust the guidance of the narrator, as Mynott describes that 
the Narnian narrator is “all-knowing” (42). The narrator is not quite “all-knowing” in every sense of 
the concept, though. This can be observed in the following examples, for instance:  
[…] since that moment no one can truly claim to have seen Reepicheep the Mouse. But 
my belief is that he came safe to Aslan’s country and is alive there to this day. (VDT 540) 
 
In fact I really think [Edmund] might have given up the whole plan and gone back and 
owned up and made friends with the others, if he hadn’t happened to say to himself, 
“When I’m King of Narnia the first thing I shall do will be to make some decent roads.” 
(LWW 152) 
 
These examples will suffice to make the case that the narrator has boundaries to his knowledge. There 
is something that connects the two examples. In the case of Reepicheep the Mouse, the narrator is not 
able to follow Reepicheep to the Narnian version of the afterlife, the Aslan’s country, as it belongs to 
the realm of the divine. Also, although he knows people’s thoughts and even futurity, he does not 
know about possible events that never took place – this would also require special divine insight.  
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Although the narrator is not omniscient in some domains of knowledge, when it comes to moral 
judgment there is no space for indeterminacy: the narrator knows what is good and evil without a 
sense of ambiguity. This can be seen, for instance, in the way the narrator reveals the character of the 
protagonists: Lucy is “a very truthful girl” (LWW 121), while Edmund “was becoming a nastier 
person every minute” (LWW 129). The narrator also wants to make certain that the readers are not 
left to themselves with the characters’ faulty judgments. Consequently, in The Horse and His Boy 
when Shasta reasons that his friend Aravis has probably left him and judges that it would be “just the 
sort of thing Aravis would do” (HB 244), the narrator jumps in and corrects Shasta’s judgment as 
follows: 
In this idea about Aravis Shasta was once more quite wrong. She was proud and could be 
hard enough but she was true as steel and would never have deserted a companion, 
whether she liked him or not. (HB 244) 
 
The narrator’s ability in moral judgment appears to be in line with the Tao in Narnia: he is an example 
of an adult who functions “within the Tao” (Abolition 727), and is thus able to discern between good 
and evil. He is also perfectly skilled in moral judgment and has access to all relevant knowledge, even 
people’s thoughts and inner motives. Therefore, he is able to exercise moral judgment without error, 
regardless of the fact that he is not divine. As the narrator, who believes firmly and unquestionably 
in objective moral truth, guides the reader all through the stories, the reader, in turn, has a sensation 
that the Moral Law is everywhere.  
Now the fact that the narrator leaves no ambiguity in moral matters has the effect that moral 
dilemmas are not left for the reader to decide. The implicit idea appears to be that the readers are not 
encouraged to interpret morality on their own, but they are invited to observe how someone who 
comprehends the universal Moral Law would view each moral dilemma. As critics such as Mynott 
view such a portrayal of moral judgment in a negative light, it is worthwhile, before moving on to the 
next topic, to consider how it might affect the readers’ view of moral judgment. 
How one sees such a view of moral judgment is clearly influenced by one’s moral philosophical 
beliefs. This can be illustrated by contrasting Lewis’s didactic narrator with Philip Pullman’s 
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(allegedly) non-didactic narrator. Naomi Wood (244) notes that the narrator in Pullman’s His Dark 
Materials series does not tell the reader how to think about the moral dilemmas “at least not in the 
direct and regulated manner of Lewis’ narrator.” Nikolajeva notes that the “ambiguity of good and 
evil” in Pullman’s trilogy is “based on the postmodern concept of indeterminacy, of the relativity of 
good and evil” (“Fairy Tale” 148). For those who subscribe to moral relativism, it could be argued 
that the children would be better left with their own judgments rather than those by the intrusive, 
biased adults in the stories. After all, who is the children’s writer to impose their set of values to the 
young? 
It has been noted already that all literature is didactic and affects its readership either covertly 
or overtly, so the question is rather how the specific kind of didacticism might influence the reader. 
When it comes to the didactic narrator in Narnia, the presence of a reliable adult narrator in children’s 
literature could be seen as an example of care for children. At least some critics have paid attention 
to the positive aspects of the didactic narrator: Barbara Wall (18) remarks concerning the didactic 
narrators in Lewis’s and Dahl’s children’s books that, “Many child readers respond favourably to the 
sense of security given to them by the familiar voice of the explaining, rather patronising, narrator”. 
Wood (242) appears to agree with Wall by saying that the narrator’s “degree of control does offer a 
degree of security: under the narrator’s guiding hand, only so much can go wrong in Narnia.” There 
appear to be arguments for both kinds of didacticism, then, depending on one’s philosophical 
position. When it comes to considering children’s literature as Character Education – the viewpoint 
adopted in this thesis – Lewis’s kind of didacticism appears to be well suited for it: character 
educators, after all, put little emphasis on novelty and creativity on moral matters, emphasizing 
conformity to the traditional virtues instead.  
The previous analysis shows that the “Deep Magic” and, to a greater extent, the didactic narrator 
in The Chronicles of Narnia function to establish a definitive moral framework with clear values: the 
universal Moral Law that Lewis refers to as the Tao. However, this says little about how the capacity 
for such moral judgement is developed, or about how one can apply moral principles when judging 
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specific cases in life. These are mainly observed in the way the literary characters, especially the 
protagonists, learn moral judgment. In the following, these aspects are focused on in order to observe 
what the actual practice of moral judgment is like in The Chronicles of Narnia. 
4.2 Narnian Lessons in Moral Judgment 
In this section, the analysis will focus on the general elements of moral judgment in Narnia, as seen 
from the viewpoint of the characters in the story. What is proposed here is that the main constituents 
of judgment in the moral fabric of Narnia are exemplified by the three informal “lessons” that the 
Pevensie children are given by their grown-up tutors who stand “within the Tao”, in other words, 
who have themselves adopted the universal moral maxims and practice moral judgment based on 
them. These elements are essentially the same three ways of moral judgment that Lewis describes in 
his essay “Why I Am Not a Pacifist”, which suggests that the Narnia novels constitute a serious 
attempt to influence the readers in their judgment skills. 
At the beginning of The Lion, the Pevensie children have serious problems with moral 
judgment. For instance, Lucy follows a “strange creature” (who is about to abduct her) into the woods 
(LWW 116), Edmund reveals details to an evil Witch about his family with grave consequences (LWW 
125), and Susan and Peter make hasty evaluations of the evidence at hand and fail to do justice to 
Lucy’s claims (LWW 130). Nevertheless, by the end of book the Pevensie children appear to have 
mastered moral judgment. They have become kings and queens, which clearly entails highly 
developed moral judgment: 
And they made good laws and kept the peace and saved good trees from being 
unnecessarily cut down, and liberated young dwarfs and young satyrs from being sent to 
school, and generally stopped busybodies and interferers and encouraged ordinary people 
who wanted to live and let live. (LWW 194) 
 
What accounts for the protagonists’ development from their humble beginnings at the start of The 
Lion to being masters in moral judgment at the end of the novel and in the sequels? 
It will be here suggested that the answer lies in a series of informal “lessons” that the children 
are offered in the story. Mynott has noted how the implied author of The Lion uses three male adult 
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characters – Professor Kirke, Mr Beaver, and Aslan – as secondary narrators who tell the children 
how they ought to interpret certain events and actions. With his narrators, then, Lewis attempts to 
initiate both the protagonists and the readers of the stories into “the distinction between right and 
wrong, good and evil” (Mynott 40).  
While Mynott’s suggestion captures the general contents of the lessons, it is still quite vague. 
In this analysis, Mynott’s notion of the children’s encounters with the adults as lessons in morality 
will be developed further, and it will be proposed that each of the three encounters with the “adult 
guides” of the children reveal a particular aspect of moral judgment that, together, make up the core 
of the holistic view of moral judgment in Narnia. First, Professor Kirke initiates the children into 
deductive reasoning by helping them evaluate Lucy’s case for Narnia. Secondly, Mr Beaver helps the 
children become aware of the power of moral intuition that is essential for value judgments of the 
classical kind, as seen in the concept of Practical Reason. Finally, Aslan stands for the ultimate 
example of morality. After meeting the Lion, the children’s primary way of judging between what is 
good and evil essentially stems out of the knowledge of Aslan by imitating him. The present chapter, 
then, analyzes Narnian moral judgment as constituting primarily from these three elements: Logic, 
Conscience (including Practical Reason), and Imitation. Before analyzing the individual elements, 
however, the implications of the child characters’ faulty judgment at the beginning of the series will 
be considered in more detail, as it is contrasted with the subsequent lessons in judgment and as it 
highlights the children’s need for learning moral judgment of a better kind. 
4.2.1 Narnian Children in Need of Better Judgment 
This section sets out to analyze examples of the kind of moral judgment that the children practice 
prior to their learning a better kind of moral judgment in Narnia. These examples will show that the 
children are in need of moral instructors when it comes to exercising good judgment. This also 
appears to reveal the implied author’s concern that his readers may have similar needs to which the 
Narnia novels are a possible solution. The examples in this chapter are all taken from scenes where 
the protagonists have not yet been taught moral judgment in Narnia or where they have not been in 
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Narnia long enough to have absorbed the stronger kind of morality that the world beyond the 
wardrobe fosters in them. 
The children’s deficient competence in moral judgment at the threshold of their Narnian 
experience is most clearly observed in the scenes where they lack moral judgment altogether. For 
instance, when Lucy Pevensie ends up in the magical world and finds a Faun there, she never stops 
to ask herself whether the creature is to be trusted. Instead, she finds herself “walking through the 
wood arm in arm with this strange creature as if they had known one another all their lives” (LWW 
116). Although the narrator does not comment on Lucy’s lack of judgment explicitly, the reader is 
left wondering whether Lucy’s mother ever warned her about trusting strangers, let alone “strange 
creatures”, in the way little children are commonly warned. Likewise, Edmund fails to stop and judge 
the situation at a crucial moment when he enters Narnia for the first time. When the evil White Witch, 
pretending to be a Queen, starts asking Edmund about his siblings, the narrator highlights Edmund’s 
lack of discernment by pointing out that he “never asked himself why the Queen should be so 
inquisitive” (LWW 125). Quite like Lucy, Edmund is trusting a complete stranger with intimate details 
of his life, and this despite the fact that he “did not like the way she looked at him” (LWW 123). These 
examples of Lucy and Edmund clearly depict the lack of what Thomas Lickona calls moral awareness 
– they “simply don’t see the ways that the situation at hand involves a moral issue and calls for moral 
judgment” (“What” 242). 
Another way the protagonists’ deficient moral judgment skills are portrayed is found in the 
scenes where the children attempt to fight against injustice towards them but are not able to oppose 
the evil acts with clear argumentation. Thus, on hearing that Mr Tumnus had planned to abduct her, 
Lucy first politely tries to ask him not to do it, “Oh, but you won’t, Mr Tumnus, […] You won’t, will 
you?” (LWW 118). Finally, Lucy confronts him by remarking that he “really mustn’t” abduct her 
(LWW 118), not augmenting the imperative with appeals to any moral principle. Luckily, the Faun’s 
heart melts and he brings Lucy back to the entrance to her world. Although this scene clearly 
resembles the tradition of romantic child heroes in children’s literature who save the situation by their 
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innocence (Nikolajeva, Rhetoric 31), it also shows the naivety of Lucy’s moral judgment. Likewise, 
in a scene in The Magician’s Nephew (MN) when Uncle Andrew does not let Digory and Polly out 
of his room, the children first ask, “Will you let us out, please?” (MN 16). As the plea goes unnoticed, 
the children then turn to an imperative: 
“Look here, Uncle Andrew,” said Digory, “it really is dinner time and they’ll be looking 
for us in a moment. You must really let us out.” 
 
“Must?” said Uncle Andrew. (MN 16) 
 
When their imperative fails, Digory and Polly “dare not say anything” and decide to try to “humour 
him” instead, with equally poor results (MN 16). Thus, the children fail to argue for their moral 
imperatives, although they instinctively appear to know them as just. 
There are a few instances where the children actually provide their claims with moral arguments 
before learning judgment from the adult figures in Narnia. Yet even then the arguments are faulty 
and hasty. Edmund’s arguments, for instance, do not follow the laws of logic. This can be observed 
in an early scene, where Lucy meets Edmund in Narnia and tells him about her second meeting with 
the Faun and reveals that the Queen is actually, according to the Faun, a terrible Witch. Edmund does 
not quite like this statement and feels ill inside. He then says to Lucy that “You can’t always believe 
what Fauns say” (LWW 128), a moral statement, which is – taken literally – quite true, as one cannot 
really “always” believe what anyone says. Edmund’s remark is not correct deductive thinking, 
however, as it moves from general to particular, making the point that sometimes the Fauns ought not 
to be trusted but at the same time leaving it open whether one ought to believe this particular Faun. 
Thus, it does not answer the question whether Lucy ought to believe Mr Tumnus the Faun. Lucy does 
not apparently notice the faulty logic behind the application of Edmund’s argument, however, as she 
rather asks how Edmund came to learn the information about the Fauns. Edmund’s answer shows his 
ignorance of logic: the only argument he gives in support of his claim is that “[e]veryone knows it 
[…] ask anybody you like” (LWW 128). With this generalization, Edmund evades the question, and 
clearly attempts to hurt Lucy by making her feel stupid for not knowing what “everyone knows”. 
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This dialogue shows that the children do not practice nor expect from each other sound logic in their 
arguments. 
The older Pevensie siblings do not fare much better. Susan and Peter’s competence in moral 
judgment at the beginning of the series is put to the test when Lucy and Edmund return from the 
magical world. Lucy has got supporting testimony for her claims about Narnia: “The others will have 
to believe in Narnia now that both of us have been there” (LWW 128). Lucy then sets the argument 
before the older siblings, who turn to Edmund for a sort of hearing. However, Edmund decides “to 
do the meanest and most spiteful thing he could think of” and denies his experience (LWW 129), and 
a moral dilemma is born. Losing what she thought to be a watertight argument, Lucy does not argue 
further for her claims but shuts down emotionally instead (LWW 121, 129). The older siblings are 
depicted as making their judgment of the case hastily based on presuppositions and, consequently, 
fail to study Lucy’s case further. Peter and Susan’s competence in judgment is portrayed as more 
mature than their younger siblings in that they discuss the case together and appear to think about 
some alternative possibilities, but it is not mature enough to solve the dilemma, which signals their 
need for better practices. 
Although the kind of faults the children have in their moral argumentation skills are probably 
commonplace and comparatively harmless in reality, the Narnia novels add weight to the seriousness 
of correct argumentation by depicting that simple mistakes in moral judgment, even when made by 
children, can bring about drastic consequences. Thus, for instance, Edmund’s lack of moral awareness 
when questioned by the White Witch turns out to be a matter of life and death. First of all, by revealing 
information about him and his siblings, Edmund is depicted as having placed him and his siblings in 
danger of their lives, as the White Witch is looking to kill the humans who fit the old prophecy of 
two kings and two queens who will end her reign (LWW 148). Secondly, Edmund also trusted the 
Queen with information about Lucy’s meeting with the Faun (LWW 125), which results in the Witch 
turning Mr Tumnus into stone. Thirdly, Edmund’s lack of judgment eventually requires Aslan’s death 
on his behalf, adding to the costly consequences of his simple mistake. 
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In addition to Edmund’s example, there is a scene where faulty moral reasoning, practiced with 
good intentions, brings about enormous negative consequences. In The Magician’s Nephew, the 
young Digory attempts to save England by taking the White Witch back to her own world where 
Digory had foolishly awakened her. Digory’s decision to confront the Witch is portrayed as an 
unselfish case of moral judgment. The reader is notified that Digory leaves out a crucial element in 
his moral reasoning, however: he forgets to test one of his premises, as the narrator points out that he 
“did not know that she had lost any of [her magical powers] by coming into our world” (MN 52). 
Consequently, the Witch would have been comparatively easy to disarm in England, whereas in the 
other worlds she would be able to do terrible magic. Ignorant of this turn of events, Digory moves 
ahead with his plan and sends the Witch to another world with a magical ring. The witch ends up in 
the newly-created Narnia, where she does not only become the White Witch that rules Narnia cruelly 
for a hundred years, but by taking the Witch to Narnia, Digory is responsible for introducing the 
concept of evil to the otherwise unspoiled world: “‘You see, friends,’ [Aslan] said, ‘that before the 
new, clean world I gave you is seven hours old, a force of evil has already entered it; waked and 
brought hither by this son of Adam’” (MN 80). The hyperbolic consequences that come out of both 
Edmund’s and Digory’s failures to judge well at the critical moment convey the implied author’s 
message that moral judgment is not a trivial matter but a vital skill without which one can cause great 
harm to both oneself and one’s fellow creatures. In Narnia at least, failure in moral judgment, even 
when carried out with good intentions, can bring about cosmic consequences.  
All of the examples above portray the children as deficient in moral judgment on their own. 
Often their judgment is based on faulty arguments, and at times they fail to stop and recognize a need 
for moral judgment altogether. With these scenes the implied author suggests that children do not 
naturally become sufficiently good at moral judgment; they need to be taught correct judgment. These 
examples stand in contrast with the developed and robust kind of moral judgment in Narnia that is 
taught to the protagonists by their superiors in a series of informal “lessons”. This proper kind of 
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moral judgment, as seen in the “lessons” will be analyzed next, in the order the aspects of moral 
judgment are introduced in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. 
4.2.2 Professor Kirke and Logic 
This section sets out to analyze the most basic form of moral judgment in The Chronicles of Narnia 
as seen in logical reasoning about truth and falsehood. The conversation between the older Pevensie 
siblings and Professor Kirke at the beginning of The Lion, which initiates the children into thorough 
logical reasoning in the first place, is a perfect example of Theoretical Reason applied to a moral 
dilemma. What will be analyzed here is how the conversation portrays the role of Theoretical Reason 
(or “Logic” as the Professor calls it; LWW 131) in moral judgment, and the conversation is here taken 
to reveal general ideas about logical reasoning that the implied author wishes for his child readers to 
adopt. 
That the conversation between Susan, Peter, and Professor Kirke is an example of Theoretical 
rather than Practical Reason is seen already in the question the conversation sets out to ask. The 
Professor’s question to the children concerns the truthfulness or falsehood of Lucy’s claims and does 
not draw on value judgments: “‘How do you know,’ he asked, ‘that your sister’s story is not true?’” 
(LWW 130). The question whether Lucy is speaking the truth or not is one of Theoretical Reason, as 
truth and falsehood concern facts and not yet values (although, of course, any claim for the preference 
of truth over falsehood would have to contain a value statement). Apart from the conversation 
between the children and the Professor, there are other moral conversations that utilize Logic in the 
series, but as the logical reasoning is mixed with value judgments in them, they will be dealt with in 
the next chapter. The conversation analyzed here works as a prime illustration of the classical concept 
of Theoretical Reason precisely on the grounds that it is purely logical, whether this aspect was 
intended by Lewis or not. 
The scene with the older Pevensie siblings and Professor Kirke portrays correct application of 
Logic as an essential and highly effective means of moral judgment. Through the scene the implied 
author suggests that a brief moment of intentional ethical judgment based on logical inference can 
46 
 
change a moral evaluation upside down. On their own, the children see two options – that Lucy is 
“either going queer in the head or else turning into a most frightful liar” (LWW 130), but a moment 
with the Professor has already expanded the alternatives to three, and the most probable alternative 
is the one the children had left out altogether.  
The Professor’s summary of the case is the first example of a thorough logical argument in The 
Chronicles: 
There are only three possibilities. Either your sister is telling lies, or she is mad, or she is 
telling the truth. You know she doesn’t tell lies and it is obvious the she is not mad. For 
the moment then, and unless any further evidence turns up, we must assume that she is 
telling the truth. (LWW 131) 
 
The Professor’s argument could be rewritten as follows: 
1. Lucy is lying, mad, or in the right. 
2. Lucy is not in the habit of lying and, therefore probably does not lie now, either. 
3. One can observe her to see that she is not mad. 
4. Therefore, she has to be in the right, unless other evidence shows up. 
 
Professor Kirke’s treatment of the moral dilemma shows how the novel recommends reaching logical 
conclusions through a clear analysis of the evidence at hand. It has left out all redundancies and only 
keeps the elements required for the sake of argument.  
“Logic” is portrayed in the scene as a powerful tool that, if mastered, helps one to evaluate the 
strength of different claims. This effect is created by the Professor’s example as he skillfully chooses 
different approaches to counter different arguments. For instance, in order to help the children judge 
between Lucy and Edmund’s accounts, he appeals to their past experience: “does your experience 
lead you to regard your brother or your sister as the more reliable?” (LWW 131). The implication is 
not only that experience is a reliable source of evidence, but also that past behavior can predict present 
and future behavior. The Professor stresses this by noting that “a charge of lying against someone 
whom you have always found truthful is a very serious thing; a very serious thing indeed” (LWW 
131). This also indicates a virtue-ethical understanding of virtues and vices as relatively stable 
indicators of one’s behavior, an idea which is also shared in Character Education (see Arthur, 
Education 2).  
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Apart from experience, observation of the facts is given as another source for arguments, and 
it is used to counter the alternative view – that Lucy has lost her sanity: “‘Madness, you mean?’ said 
the Professor quite coolly. ‘Oh, you can make your minds easy about that. One has only to look at 
her and talk to her to see that she is not mad’” (LWW 131). The Professor’s argument oversimplifies 
the reality (as a mentally ill person can appear sane in many respects), but a simple refutation of the 
claim works to keep the structure of argumentation clear, nevertheless. 
In addition, a crucial element in Narnian “Logic” is awareness and honesty with one’s 
presuppositions. This is best attested in the Professor’s decision not to leave out any possibilities 
prematurely. Susan and Peter give reasons for doubting Lucy’s account: the wardrobe leads to Narnia 
only sometimes and not always, and Lucy came away from the Wardrobe after hiding there for a few 
minutes but claimed to have been there for hours (LWW 131). Here the Professor takes an unexpected 
turn in the argument and starts to bring up the children’s presuppositions and unquestioned premises. 
What is special in the Professor’s treatment of the situation is that he subjects the miraculous to 
investigation in the same manner as he would subject ordinary events. For instance, when Susan notes 
that Lucy was in the wardrobe only for a few minutes but claims to have been there for hours, 
Professor Kirke maintains that it is exactly what supports Lucy’s case: “if, I say, she had got into 
another world, I should not be at all surprised to find that the other world had a separate time of its 
own” (LWW 132). Also, the Professor notes that girls of Lucy’s age would be unlikely to come up 
with such a developed story, where even time runs differently (LWW 132). The implication of the 
situation is that, if one is to do logical reasoning, then one needs to go all the way and come into the 
enterprise without undue presuppositions, and give every possibility a fair hearing. What the children, 
in turn, are supposed to learn from this is being aware of their preconceived ideas and to be open for 
(rational) possibilities beyond their experience. 
Logic is not portrayed as a way to reach arrogant certainty, however, but it is connected with 
the idea of probability. For instance, the Professor’s argument is not portrayed as claiming absolute 
certainty. The Professor simply works out the evidence and finds Lucy’s case the most convincing 
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“unless any further evidence turns up” (LWW 131). He is clearly in need of evidence before he can 
carry out actual moral judgments. Therefore, he is not presented as an infallible judge but as someone 
who has mastered the skill of deductive reasoning and needs to top it up with knowledge of the 
individual case in order to judge well. 
When it comes to moral judgment in Narnia, the children’s lengthy moral conversation with 
the Professor can be seen as an “introduction to the basics of moral judgment”, and it marks a definite 
change in the way the children judge. What the implied author teaches the children (and the child 
readers) through the scene is breaking the evidence into logically meaningful units and deducing 
logical conclusions based on observation, experience, and probability, among other things. Although 
the Professor’s argumentation itself might not be complete, the implication of the passage, 
nevertheless, is that unbiased moral reasoning can lead to possibilities not considered otherwise and 
can arrive at truth, as will be revealed to the children when they finally enter Narnia. Also implied is 
that moral dilemmas are best discussed with other people – that discussing moral dilemmas with 
others can broaden one’s perspective and make it more likely for one to practice better judgment.  
It seems that all of the elements in Narnian “Logic” coincide with Lewis’s actual beliefs about 
Reason (even the hint at supernaturalism, as seen in Lewis’s book Miracles, a rational argument for 
miraculous events). It may not be a coincidence that Logic is introduced before the other two kinds 
of moral judgment in the novels, as it is clearly the lightest and “easiest” form of moral judgment, 
and the other forms presuppose and are built on it. Lewis also called Theoretical Reason (or Logic) 
the “most useful analogy” to understanding Practical Reason (“Why” 281). In his philosophical 
works, by making his readers first understand the way logical inference works, Lewis thought to help 
them understand that our moral evaluation of good and evil work in a similar fashion. In the same 
way, the Professor’s “lesson” on Logic can be seen to prepare the children for the subsequent lessons 
on explicitly moral evaluation. The next chapter, then, considers the portrayal of Conscience, or value 
judgments, in The Chronicles of Narnia. 
49 
 
4.2.3 Conscientia, Mr Beaver, and Practical Reason 
While the previous section focused on the most basic form of moral judgment in Narnia, reasoning 
about truth and falsehood, this section concentrates on judgments about good and evil, that is, 
judgments of value. For Lewis, the means of judging between good and evil lies in his concept of the 
conscience. As held by Lewis (“Why” 281), there are two aspects to the conscience: the emotional 
(Conscientia) and the cognitive (Practical Reason). While both senses are relevant to understanding 
moral judgment, Conscientia has considerably less prominence in Narnia than Practical Reason. 
Thus, the section unfolds by first considering the portrayal of Conscientia in Narnia in brief, followed 
by a more detailed consideration of Practical Reason and the related concept of moral intuition, which 
is the most relevant element that distinguishes it from Theoretical Reason. 
The few explicit instances of Conscientia in The Chronicles are all connected with Lucy: 
[…] Lucy’s conscience smote her and she said, “I think I really must go and see Eustace. 
Seasickness is horrid, you know.” (VDT 434) 
 
[…] All the others were there with him waiting, and Lucy’s conscience smote her when 
she saw their anxious faces and realized how long she had forgotten them. (VDT 503) 
 
The examples portray the conscience as smiting a person after they have done something wrong or 
as they are neglecting a certain duty. The conscience is also clearly portrayed as subjective. This can 
be observed in the fact that when Lucy feels that she must go and see the seasick cabin member, the 
others do not share her opinion: Caspian (also presented as a morally admirable person) suggests that 
Lucy’s magical healing drops would be “wasted on a thing like seasickness” (VDT 434). Irrespective 
of the subjectivity of its demands (as it is based on one’s knowledge of good and evil which is, in 
turn, subject to change) the conscience is nevertheless not to be argued with. (Lewis might have 
thought that working against one’s conscience, even though it would not be objective, might harden 
the conscience, damaging its functionality.) Thus, Lucy does not start questioning her conscience (for 
instance, by challenging its demands with Caspian’s opinions) but, instead, simply obeys it. Since 
Lucy is portrayed as a virtuous character throughout the series, it is implied that following her 
conscience is the right thing to do, although the narrator does not say it explicitly.  
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All of the aforementioned qualities of the conscience appear to be in line with Lewis’s 
understanding of Conscientia. Lewis does not deal with explicit questions related to Conscientia 
extensively in his theory or in The Chronicles, perhaps for the reason that it is in his thinking simply 
to be obeyed, making it a topic easy to cover quickly. The more interesting topic is considering one’s 
knowledge of good and evil, which can be improved. Therefore, without lingering on Conscience for 
any longer, the remaining part of this chapter focuses on the portrayal of Practical Reason in the 
Narnia novels. 
As explained previously, Practical Reason differs from Theoretical Reason in that the premises 
from which the “practical” conclusions are drawn contain value judgments, whereas Theoretical 
Reason draws on universal “intellectual principles” (“On Living” 364). One recognizes these 
principles, whether logical or moral, through what Lewis calls “intuition” (“Why” 283), and 
therefore, the starting point of learning Practical Reason is to recognize what the correct intuitions 
are. What will be considered next, then, is how the Narnian characters are portrayed to arrive at value 
judgments through the help of moral intuition. 
The implied author suggests that, on their own, the children fail to consciously listen to the 
witness of the Moral Law “deep down inside” them. Thus, Edmund attempts to excuse his obedience 
to the Witch, although it “wasn’t a very good excuse, however, for deep down inside him he really 
knew that the White Witch was bad and cruel” (LWW 152). As they are not aware of them, the 
children need help in recognizing the moral intuitions, which is provided to them in the form of Mr 
Beaver’s informal “lesson”. In the scene, Mr Beaver tells Edmund’s siblings that they need not look 
for him, as he tells them that “we know already where he’s gone”, to meet the Witch herself (LWW 
148). The siblings deny the charge against Edmund on the grounds that he could not do something so 
evil, but Mr Beaver appeals to their intuitions: 
“Can’t he?” said Mr Beaver, looking very hard at the three children, and everything they 
wanted to say died on their lips, for each felt suddenly quite certain inside that this was 
exactly what Edmund had done. (LWW 149) 
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This example reveals how one is able to utilize moral intuition to arrive at true moral knowledge. On 
the conscious level, the children do not want to accept that their brother would be evil. However, Mr 
Beaver is convinced that they know the moral truth inside them and, by insisting them to “feel” the 
thoughts at a deeper level, is able to make them realize it consciously. Thus, the children are portrayed 
as needing outside help to learn to discern moral intuition, which also explains why Edmund, who 
had no-one to accompany him when encountered by the Witch, did not stop and listen to the warning 
signals. 
The function of the intuitions is to reveal to the children whether a person is good or evil, and 
it appears to be at its strongest when the children encounter characters that are extremely good or evil. 
Thus, deep down inside, Edmund “really knew that the White Witch was bad and cruel” (LWW 152). 
In another scene in Prince Caspian (PC), Susan recognizes Aslan (the epitome of virtue) regardless 
of her attempts of self-denial: “I really believed it was him tonight, when you woke us up. I mean, 
deep down inside. Or I could have, if I’d let myself.” (PC 386). The essential difference between 
Edmund’s and Susan’s instances of moral intuition is that, while moral intuition warns Edmund of an 
evil character, Susan recognizes a righteous character on the same basis. The similarity of the 
examples lies in the fact that moral intuition includes primarily knowledge about the goodness of 
characters, not acts. 
The Narnian portrayal of moral intuition as revealing primarily information about the moral 
character of another person is interesting in light of the fact that the Laws of Tao (the basic intuitions) 
are all about the rightness or wrongness of particular acts. In this sense the Narnian moral intuitions 
are not in agreement with Lewis’s theoretical account of the Tao. It is a debated question whether one 
recognizes a good act or person first, in other words, whether one recognizes good acts as what a 
good person would do, or a good person from the acts they are practicing. There are some modern 
researchers who argue that there may be some truth in the primacy of characters in moral judgment. 
Eric Luis Uhlmann et al., for instance, claim that “when making moral evaluations, it appears as if 
individuals are often not asking themselves ‘is this act right or wrong’ but rather are asking 
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themselves ‘is this person good or bad?’” (72). Whether the primacy in reality lies on acts or 
characters, the Narnian kind of moral intuition is character-based in this sense – approximating a 
special kind of virtue-ethical understanding of moral intuition. 
In addition to the kind of moral knowledge intuition conveys, the way in which the intuitions 
are formed is also peculiar. The scene with Mr Beaver suggests that one comes to have the moral 
intuition by beholding the outward appearance of the others: 
“I didn’t like to mention it before (he being your brother and all) but the moment I set 
eyes on that brother of yours I said to myself “Treacherous”. He had the look of one who 
has been with the Witch and eaten her food. You can always tell them if you’ve lived 
long in Narnia; something about their eyes.” (LWW 149) 
 
Mr Beaver reveals that the process by which one comes to have the moral knowledge about the person 
is visual: Edmund had “the look of one who has been with the Witch” (LWW 149). The visual element 
in receiving intuition is further emphasized by the fact that it is the visual organ that is especially 
telling, as seen in Mr Beaver’s statement that assessing the evil characters’ wickedness is connected 
to “something about their eyes” (LWW 149). Once one has received the required visual data for moral 
intuition, however, then one needs only to meditate on it, which can be done even though the person 
in question would not be present. Thus, the Pevensie children also recognize intuitively that Edmund 
has become evil, although he is not to be seen there and then (LWW 149). 
Regardless of the vagueness concerning the reception of the needed sense data for moral 
intuition (“something about their eyes”), intuition is nevertheless portrayed as an exceptionally 
effective means of acquiring true moral knowledge, as implied by Mr Beaver’s being able to “always 
tell them” (LWW 149). Furthermore, moral intuition is portrayed as something that can be tested. Mr 
Beaver knows that the kind of evil look Edmund had is attained only by meeting the Witch and eating 
her food, so he tests his hypothesis by asking whether Edmund has indeed been to Narnia before. As 
the children tell him he has been there by himself, his hypothesis on the events appears more credible 
to the others. Therefore, although the children’s moral intuitions tell them that Mr Beaver is in the 
right even before any logical argumentation, Mr Beaver makes the children believe in it further by 
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providing evidence for his theory, which suggests that intuition is both non-rational and rational: one 
“just sees” it, but it can be tested by the way of logical inquiry. 
The curious way in which moral intuition is connected to outward appearance and impressions 
does not occur exclusively in the scene with Mr Beaver; rather, it represents a common phenomenon 
in The Chronicles in general. Wood (2001, 249) notes that in Narnia, “We’re frequently told that 
looks, particularly the eyes, tell observant people all they need to know about whom to trust.” For 
instance, Digory notices that Jadis the Witch’s face has the “same hungry and greedy look which he 
had lately seen on Uncle Andrew’s” (MN 42). Polly sees a connection between the Witch and the 
vicious Uncle Andrew, too: “there was a sort of likeness between her face and his, something in the 
expression. It was the look that all wicked Magicians have” (MN 45). The fact that both of the children 
see the same connection between the two magicians suggests that their impressions were not merely 
subjective opinions but rather instances of truthful judgment: the magicians do not simply look 
wicked; they are wicked and even their faces reveal it. 
One does not recognize only evil characters by their looks, but both good and evil characters 
are revealed by it once one learns the practice. An especially telling scene to illustrate this is found 
in The Magician’s Nephew, where Digory and Polly enter a room full of petrified people and start 
judging them based on their faces. The people closest to the entrance of the room are judged to be 
good by the children: “All the faces they could see were certainly nice” (MN 34). As they move on, 
the faces begin to look more evil: “The faces here looked very strong and proud and happy, but they 
looked cruel” (MN 34). Finally, Digory and Polly come to the Witch who was exceedingly beautiful 
but “with a look of such fierceness and pride that it took your breath away” (MN 34). The children’s 
impressions based on the faces are portrayed as trustworthy sources of judgment, and the faces are 
portrayed as revealing information not only about the moral character of the people but also some 
more detailed information such as their contentment in life. 
The looks of a face can even tell of a sudden change for the better. In The Silver Chair, when 
the children meet the enchanted Prince Rilian for the first time, he “looked both bold and kind, though 
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there was something about his face that didn’t seem quite right” (SC 619) and the children are not 
able to fully trust him. When the children finally set him free and break the spell, the narrator notes 
that “the something wrong, whatever it was, had vanished from his face” (SC 626). The numerous 
examples above point to the centrality of impression to moral judgment in Narnia: one is able to tell 
whether someone is good or evil based on intuition that is, in turn, informed by impression. 
It is clear that the Narnian portrayal of how one is to arrive at the moral intuitions differs from 
Lewis’s actual ideas about moral intuitions utilized in Practical Reason. When Lewis wrote about 
“intuitive knowledge” in the process of Practical Reason, he meant the universal ability of people to 
“just see” that certain moral maxims are always true: “if there can be a difference of opinion which 
does not reveal one of the parties as a moral idiot, then it is not an intuition” (“Why” 283). Thus, the 
statement that “health and harmony are good” is a moral intuition (as one “just sees” it), whereas “all 
strong drink is forbidden” is not (283). Such a picture of moral intuition is clearly different from the 
idea present in the Narnia novels that looks betray moral character. The fact that Lewis’s actual beliefs 
on intuition diverge from the Narnian model of intuition suggests that Lewis did not intend the reader 
to pick up the emphasis on impression as a real characteristic of moral intuition. In the novels, the 
emphasis on appearance as an indicator of morality may have served a purely artistic function for 
Lewis, as it may be difficult to portray something as vague as moral intuition without reference to 
some physical element. Also, it could help a child reader to visualize the morality of a literary 
character better when it is reinforced with visual cues that agree with the moral qualities. 
Intuition is not all there is to Practical Reason, however. In both Lewis’s theory and The 
Chronicles, the moral knowledge attained intuitively becomes truly effective only after it is used in 
conscious moral reasoning, which is clearly a point that Lewis would have wanted his readers to 
learn. Once the Narnian characters have learnt to hearken to the moral intuitions within themselves, 
they are then able to practice effective Practical Reason. For instance, in the scene with the Beaver, 
moral intuition made the children, it appears, only aware that their brother has indeed become evil. 
The rest of the conclusion (that Edmund had gone to see the Witch) is arrived at through logical 
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inference that takes advantage of the intuition. This can be observed in the way Mr Beaver came up 
with the conclusion. Firstly, he recognized from Edmund’s eyes that he had “been with the Witch and 
eaten her food” (LWW 149). Then, although the text does not explicitly say it, Mr Beaver made a 
logical inference that he had gone to the Witch to betray the others to her (LWW 149). Thus, the 
knowledge provided by moral intuition is used as a premise for reasoning. This aspect of the Narnian 
moral intuition is clearly connected to Lewis’s idea of the “first principles of Practical Reason” – the 
children are intuitively aware of some value judgments in their hearts that they then are able to use in 
their conscious acts of reasoning. 
The scene with Mr Beaver and the children is a vivid example of how to recognize the moral 
intuitions within oneself, but it is not a particularly clear example of Practical Reason otherwise, as 
it leaves out certain steps in the logical argument. A better example of Practical Reason in use can be 
seen in a conversation between Digory (who is, interestingly, Professor Kirke, the master of Logic) 
and his evil Uncle Andrew in The Magician’s Nephew. In the scene, Digory attempts to confront 
Uncle Andrew by poor argumentation in vain. By observing Uncle Andrew’s black magic, he then 
learns that magic is real. Based on this understanding, he comes up with the first solid argument 
against Uncle Andrew: 
“[…] I didn’t believe in Magic till today. I see now it’s real. Well, if it is, I suppose all 
the old fairy tales are more or less true. And you’re simply a wicked, cruel magician like 
the ones in the stories. Well, I’ve never read a story in which people of that sort weren’t 
paid out in the end, and I bet you will be. And serve you right.” (MN 22)  
 
Digory’s argument (perhaps the future Professor Kirke’s first successful one) is a clear use of Logic 
in moral judgment. He learns that magic is real, which is a judgment of fact. However, the argument 
also includes a value judgment (“you’re simply a wicked, cruel magician”), which Digory learns 
intuitively by looking at Uncle Andrew’s face (MN 42). Digory’s argument could be sketched as 
follows:  
1. Magic is true. (a judgment of fact) 
2. Therefore, old fairy tales are likely to contain truth as well. 
3. Cruel magicians are punished at the end of all fairy tales.  
4. Uncle Andrew is a wicked Magician. (a judgment of value) 
5. Therefore, he will be punished at the end. 
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Interestingly, Digory’s kind of Practical Reason which combines Logic with a moral intuition 
is portrayed as carrying weight in communication and as an especially effective way of confronting 
evil. What Digory argues eventually comes true (which shows that Digory’s judgment was true), but 
even in the moment his argument has an effect on the villain: “Of all the things Digory had said this 
was the first that really went home. Uncle Andrew started and there came over his face a look of such 
horror that, beast though he was, you could almost feel sorry for him” (MN 22). The effectiveness of 
moral reasoning is further emphasized by the fact that Digory, a child, is able to confront an evil adult 
by resorting to it. Thus, in Narnia, while intuition is a trustworthy source of moral judgment even on 
its own, it shows its full potential in moral judgment only when combined with Logic to form coherent 
instances of Practical Reason.  
Also, as the scene with Digory shows, in the end, Logic and value judgments often work 
together in arguments, suggesting that after the concepts of Logic and moral intuition have been 
introduced, it is no longer feasible to talk about “Theoretical Reason” and “Practical Reason” 
separately. Rather, we can simply talk about Reason that draws on two kinds of premises: logical and 
moral. Thus, in The Abolition Lewis notes that we need to “extend the word Reason to include what 
our ancestors called Practical Reason” (Abolition 707). 
The previous and the present section suggest that much of Lewis’s essential notions on moral 
reasoning in his non-fiction are also to be found in The Chronicles of Narnia, although some elements 
take more literary forms in his fiction. Apart from Reason, there is a wholly another way of moral 
judgment – imitation – which appears to (at least partially) substitute the two earlier forms and which 
is portrayed as the highest model of judgment. It will be considered next. 
4.2.4 Imitation of Aslan 
So far, it has been analyzed how the Narnian protagonists acquire and utilize Logic and Conscience 
as ways of moral judgment, and the two can be seen as forming the backbone of their judgment. Yet 
there is still a third major element in Narnian moral judgment – imitation of a virtuous character – 
which is revealed in what Mynott sees as the third “lesson” that the Pevensie children receive from 
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their adult guides, this time indirectly from Aslan. It is perhaps no coincidence that the Pevensie 
children pick it up last, as imitation also represents the ultimate way of judgment in Lewis’s thinking. 
After their acquaintance with Aslan, the Pevensie children’s rudimentary skills in judgment 
give way to another form of judgment. This is seen, for instance, in the following example in The 
Last Battle: “‘Don’t try to stop me, Peter,’ said Lucy, ‘I am sure Aslan would not. I am sure it is not 
wrong to mourn for Narnia’” (LB 753). Essentially, this form of judgment approximates the virtue-
ethical approach to moral judgment. After all, a virtue ethicist asks what a virtuous person would do 
in given situations (Louden 495). Similarly, the children ask what a virtuous person – in this case, 
Aslan – would do in the situation at hand. Moral imitation of this sort involves two major elements: 
firstly, becoming acquainted with the virtuous character and observing his traits and, secondly, 
imagining how those traits could be applied to the present situation. While the children imitate Aslan 
in many nuanced ways, the present analysis focuses on a few essential and recurring characteristics 
of Aslan that are also clearly imitated by the children. 
One of the primary characteristics of Aslan imitated by the children is his portrayal as someone 
who is able to reconcile justice with mercy. The sense of Aslan’s perfect commitment to justice is 
conveyed to the reader through his unwavering obedience to the Narnian concept of the Moral Law 
as seen in the Deep Magic. Even a suggestion of working against the Moral Law is too much for him: 
“‘Work against the Emperor’s Magic?’ said Aslan, turning to her with something like a frown on his 
face. And nobody ever made that suggestion to him again’” (LWW 176). On one hand, then, Aslan is 
perfectly just. On the other hand, he is also characterized as merciful and loving. This trait is most 
clearly exemplified when Aslan sacrifices his own life to save Edmund, who deserves death for his 
betrayal of the others. In the end, Aslan is resurrected, however, due to “a magic deeper still” (LWW 
185), which Schakel (177) interprets as “the power of love, the strength of the Good”. What this 
suggests is that Aslan not only upholds the Moral Law, but he also stands above the Law. He honors 
the demand of the Law that Edmund’s betrayal requires a death, but then he willfully acts out of 
mercy to exchange his own life with Edmund’s. After the event, what Aslan did to Edmund comes to 
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describe his character. This is seen, for example, when King Tirian considers the difference between 
Aslan and Tash, the Calormene god: “He meant to go on and ask how the terrible god Tash who fed 
on the blood of his people could possibly be the same as the good Lion by whose blood all Narnia 
was saved” (LB 686). These traits of justice and mercy are also found together around the character 
of Aslan. For example, when giving orders to the first human King and Queen of Narnia, Aslan 
commands them to be “just and merciful” (MN 99), and, on the other hand, he later warns that there 
will be rulers on Earth who do not care about “justice and mercy” (MN 102). 
The way Aslan reconciles justice with mercy works as an example for the children in moral 
judgment. This can be seen, for instance, in a scene where the characters are deciding what do to 
about Rabadash, a foreign traitor. King Lune tells the offender that “by the law of nations as well as 
by all reasons of prudent policy” they have the right to kill him (HB 306), implying that the universally 
accepted moral laws ascertain their right to execute the traitor. Edmund, inspired by what Aslan did 
to him, is ready to give up this right in order to show mercy: “But even a traitor may mend. I have 
known one that did” (HB 305). Edmund’s merciful approach is confirmed to be in line with Aslan’s 
thinking when Aslan suddenly shows up and judges the traitor: instead of punishing the traitor with 
death, Aslan turns him into an ass and notes: “Justice shall be mixed with mercy. You shall not always 
be an Ass” (HB 307). Although Aslan came and judged the traitor himself, Edmund is portrayed as 
someone would have been able to judge mercifully as he had observed (and felt) the mercy of Aslan’s 
way of judging himself. 
Another recurring characteristic of Aslan that is imitated by the children can be found in the 
idea that he is “good but not safe”: “‘Then he isn’t safe?’ said Lucy. ‘Safe?’ said Mr Beaver; […] 
‘Course he isn’t safe. But he’s good. He’s the King, I tell you’” (LWW 146). This characteristic of 
Aslan as somehow good yet fearsome is present, for instance, in the symbolism that, in addition to 
his Lion form, he takes the form of a Lamb in another scene (VDT 540). This points to the fact that 
Aslan’s characteristic as both the meek Lamb and the fearsome Lion is inspired by depictions of 
Christ as both the Lamb of God and the Lion of Judah (Edwards 34). 
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This second characteristic of Aslan appears to be imitated by the Pevensie children in situations 
requiring fierceness such as battles. Whenever the children are required to take arms, they are not 
afraid to do so yet they always fight fairly. This is observed, for instance, in a scene where Peter the 
rightful High King of Narnia challenges Miraz, an evil ruler who has usurped the Narnian throne, to 
a duel. The men are both described as skilled swordsmen (VDT 405), but the essential difference 
between them lies in their character. When Peter falls on one knee, the usurper is quickly to use the 
opportunity for his advantage but he fails. When Miraz falls, on the contrary, Peter is described as 
having “stepped back, waiting for him to rise” (VDT 405). Edmund then comments on the scene: 
“Need he be as gentlemanly as all that? I suppose he must. Comes of being a Knight and a High King. 
I suppose it is what Aslan would like” (VDT 406). Peter imitates Aslan in that he is fierce and not 
afraid to confront anyone, but, on the other hand, he is also gentle and fair. The motivation lies in his 
admiration for Aslan, as Edmund estimates (correctly) that “it is what Aslan would like” (VDT 406).  
Although imitation is closely connected with Aslan, the Narnia novels do not, however, suggest 
that moral imitation would only be restricted to perfect moral agents like Aslan, as he is not the only 
“virtuous agent” that is imitated in Narnia. For instance, in a scene in The Silver Chair, Eustace’s 
judgment in the situation is based on imitating another virtuous character he has met in Narnia earlier: 
“If my old friend Reepicheep the Mouse were here, he would say we could not now refuse the 
adventures of Bism without a great impeachment to our honour” (SC 645). As Eustace has acquainted 
himself with Reepicheep earlier, he is able to tell what Reepicheep would suggest for them to do, 
even though the mouse is not present himself. However, Reepicheep is not portrayed as an unfailing 
model to be imitated and, therefore, it is difficult to say whether imitating Reepicheep in the situation 
would have been a good decision or not. After all, Aslan questions Reepicheep’s understanding of 
honor (probably the most outstanding trait in his character) elsewhere in the series: “I have sometimes 
wondered, friend, […] whether you do not think too much about your honour” (PC 412). These 
extracts suggest that, although Aslan the most suitable “virtuous agent” to be imitated, imitation of a 
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virtuous character in Narnia does not only concern him and the characters can also learn from each 
other. 
Also, the implied author does not suggest that moral imitation ought to contradict or replace 
other forms of judgment. This can be observed in The Last Battle, where a false Aslan appears. The 
Narnians are dismayed at the orders of the fake Aslan and doubt whether the real Aslan would be like 
that: “you think it is really Aslan who is killing the Wood-Nymphs and making you all slaves to the 
King of Calormen?” (LB 688). In the end, the Narnians who simply believe uncritically in the false 
Aslan are doomed, while those who discern that the real Aslan would be good (it is implied that they 
know what good means) are able to imitate the real Aslan, even though he is not present. 
Consequently, being able to judge good and evil is portrayed as a prerequisite for recognizing a 
virtuous character. Otherwise imitation would equal blind trust in a character who might as well be 
evil. 
Although most of the Narnian protagonists learn moral imitation by getting to know Aslan 
personally, there are also other way such as history and stories that are depicted as additional means 
through which one can learn to know the virtuous character. King Tirian, for instance, only knows 
Aslan from stories of old (LB 690), but is, nevertheless, able to tell the difference between the real 
Aslan and a counterfeit (LB 686). Consequently, King Tirian functions as a model for the real readers 
of the story who get to know Aslan through literature. The fact that Aslan is a literary character does 
not constitute a problem from a moral educational point of view, as Gregory Currie points out that “it 
is possible to imitate merely imagined people” (336). Furthermore, it could be argued that literary 
characters are even better objects of imitation than real people, as they are “transparent in a way real 
people can never be” (Nikolajeva, Rhetoric x). 
As the other forms of judgment give way to imitation to a large extent, the Narnia novels 
implicitly suggest that imitating a virtuous agent is the ultimate way of moral judgment. The same 
seems to be true of Lewis’s philosophy in general. Lewis thought that, ultimately, what it means to 
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be good is to follow the virtuous person’s – in Lewis’s view, the Christ’s – example. He writes to 
Christians, 
For you are no longer thinking simply about right and wrong; you are trying to catch the 
good infection from a Person. It is more like painting a portrait than like obeying a set of 
rules. And the odd thing is that while in one way it is much harder than keeping rules, in 
another way it is far easier” (Mere Christianity 152) 
 
This quote suggests that imitation is not about staying merely at the level of right and wrong, but 
going beyond it, moving from questions of what is right and wrong to trying to be good in a dynamic 
way. It is also a highly creative way of judgment, as implied by Lewis’s comparison of imitation to 
“painting a portrait” (152). Apparently, this is where Lewis also thought that didacticism and 
aesthetics converge: morality, at its highest form, is more like art than doctrine. 
In this and the previous sections, it has been showed how the Narnia novels portray moral 
judgment as consisting of three major elements – Logic, Conscience, and Imitation. These are largely 
in line with Lewis’s philosophy, which suggests that Lewis wished his readership to learn better at 
moral judgment in their actual lives through reading the Narnia novels. The elements studied in this 
section have touched on what the capacity and practice of moral judgment is like. The remaining 
section of the analysis, however, touches on cultural aspects of moral judgment: how does one learn 
moral judgment, and, if moral knowledge is claimed to be innately available through the Moral Law, 
how does culture affect one’s moral judgment? 
4.3 Culture and Moral Judgment in The Chronicles 
What have been analyzed so far are the portrayal of the Moral Law and the essential elements of 
moral judgment in Narnia seen in Logic, Conscience, and Imitation. Apart from these, the Narnian 
portrayal of moral judgment touches on cultural aspects of moral judgment such as the role of 
upbringing for one’s moral judgment. While there are many nuanced cultural elements that relate to 
judgment in Narnia, the present section focuses on a few recurring aspects, namely, upbringing, 
education, literature, and the moral beliefs of a community. 
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Before moving on to the analysis, a note will be due on the seeming contradiction between the 
portrayal of moral judgment as linked to the universal Moral Law and one’s learning it through 
culture. Lewis acknowledged that culture has an effect on one’s capacity to see the Moral Law, but 
did not see it as a threat to his theory. Although he held that the Moral Law is “universal” in that it is 
innately accessible to people of different cultures and generations, Lewis believed that one’s 
awareness of the Moral Law is largely culture-bound. This can be seen in the fact that the way to be 
instructed in the Moral Law is to go “back to your nurse and your father, to all the poets and sages 
and law givers” (“On Ethics” 313). Elsewhere, Lewis also notes that one learns the Moral Law “from 
parents and teachers, and friends and books, as we learn everything else” (Mere Christianity 21). This 
idea that one learns both the Moral Law and moral judgment culturally is not only true of Lewis’s 
philosophy in general but also of the portrayal of moral judgment in The Chronicles of Narnia, as 
will be suggested in the analysis below. 
4.3.1 Upbringing and Education 
The first part of this section considers the roles that upbringing and education play concerning the 
children’s moral judgment in The Chronicles. The section broadens the analysis on Narnian moral 
judgment by considering what expectations and attitudes are shown towards parents and teachers 
when it comes to teaching good judgment to children. In his non-fiction, Lewis shows considerable 
critique towards education in general and moral education in particular – attitudes which are clearly 
present in his children’s series, too, as will be shown below. 
The Narnia novels (like children’s fiction in general) have little to say about the parents of the 
protagonists and, consequently, about their upbringing. Nonetheless, there is a passage where the 
moral upbringing of one of the children is brought up, and it appears to reflect Lewis’s concerns on 
the subject. When he encounters a moral dilemma in The Magician’s Nephew, Digory connects the 
universal moral imperatives to his mother who has reinforced them in him: “Mother […] wouldn’t 
like it – awfully strict about keeping promises – and not stealing – and all that sort of thing. She’d tell 
me not to do it – quick as anything – if she was here” (MN 94; emphasis in original). These moral 
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principles introduced by Digory’s mother are clearly helpful in moral judgment, as Digory is able to 
turn away the Witch’s enticing proposals by referring to them (MN 94). The implied author highlights 
Digory’s mother as a good example of a moral educator and uses Digory’s successful judgment as an 
opportunity to criticize the modern parents’ failure to reinforce these moral principles in their 
children, as seen in the narrator’s comment that “[t]hings like Do Not Steal were, I think, hammered 
into boys’ heads a good deal harder in those days than they are now” (MN 92). At the beginning of 
The Magician’s Nephew, the reader is told that the story “happened long ago when your grandfather 
was a child” (MN 11). This comment reveals that the stories take place in Lewis’s mental image of 
the late 19th century, and together with the previous quotes, the narrator suggests that contemporary 
parents would do good to learn from the moral educational practices that took place in the home back 
then. 
The question rises, from a Moral Law perspective, whether Digory’s morality is portrayed as 
having been simply taught by his Mother, with no regard to objective truth or claims of intrinsic 
goodness present in Lewis’s theory of the Tao. A closer look at the novel reveals that this is not the 
case, however. The implied author is clearly aware of the question, as the view of morality as simply 
growing out of one’s culture is expressed by one of the villains. The wicked Uncle Andrew despises 
Digory’s moral imperatives at the beginning of the book and hints that they are only arbitrary and not 
universal:  
“Oh, I see. You mean that little boys ought to keep their promises. Very true: most right 
and proper, I’m sure, and I’m very glad you have been taught to do it. But of course you 
must understand that rules of that sort, however excellent they may be for little boys – 
and servants – and women – and even people in general, can’t possibly be expected to 
apply to profound students and great thinkers and sages. […] Men like me, who possess 
hidden wisdom, are freed from common rules […]. (MN 19) 
 
While Uncle Andrew’s challenge is never explicitly refuted by commenting that the moral rules are 
ultimate and universal, they are implicitly shown to be such by the overall perspective of the Moral 
Law in the novels. Also, Uncle Andrew is shown to have been inherently aware of his vices, as he is 
depicted as showing feelings of remorse, when he enters Narnia and fears that he has come to the 
afterlife: “Is this the end? I can’t bear it. I never meant to be a Magician. It’s all a misunderstanding” 
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(MN 59). Also, Uncle Andrew himself is portrayed at the end of the book as having “learned his 
lesson” and having become “a nicer and less selfish old man than he had ever been before” (MN 106). 
These extracts imply that the view of moral maxims as simply taught to people without reference to 
any universal authority is not believed (deep down inside) even by the characters who criticize it. 
Consequently, Digory has not been taught moral principles simply because little children ought to be 
instructed in them, but because they are universally applicable. 
Apart from upbringing, the portrayal of moral judgment in The Chronicles of Narnia comments 
on the role of education, too. The Professor appears to be of the opinion that formal education ought 
to have helped the children acquire the skills for logical reasoning of his sort. This is apparent in the 
Professor’s remarks provoked by their ignorance such as “Why don’t they teach logic at these 
schools?” (LWW 131) and “I wonder what they do teach them at these schools” (LWW 132; emphasis 
in original). These comments probably reflect Lewis’s general suspicion towards the supposed 
progress of the modern education system, as seen in The Abolition of Man. Lewis writes that, instead 
of educators and their ambitious (and often faulty) programs, it is the “real mothers, real nurses, and 
(above all) real children” who have preserved “the human race in such sanity as it still possesses” 
(Abolition 721). The quote implies that, while Lewis is somewhat hopeful of the moral education in 
the home, he is suspicious of the school’s ability to provide its input. The most hopeful he is of the 
“real children”, as they still possess the capability of learning the correct moral maxims. 
The examples above suggest that, while schools are expected to teach logical thought that is 
needed for proper moral reasoning, parents (and mothers in particular) are expected to reinforce the 
moral principles in the home, providing ethical maxims from which moral arguments can be deduced. 
This progression from first acquiring the core virtues and moral maxims to learning moral reasoning 
later is age-old. Lewis quotes (and agrees with) Aristotle that, first, “the aim of education is to make 
the pupil like and dislike what he ought” and only when  
the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in “ordinate 
affections” or “just sentiments” will easily find the first principles in Ethics, but to the 
corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science. 
(Abolition 700) 
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Thus, because the Narnian characters have been endowed with virtues, they are also able to carry out 
moral judgments in the way of the Moral Law. This can be seen, for instance, in Eustace when he 
reveals his rationale for not leaving his Narnian friends in trouble: “I’d rather be killed fighting for 
Narnia than grow old and stupid at home and perhaps go about in a Bath chair and then die in the end 
just the same” (LB 720). The fact that Eustace prefers a valiant death in battle to living in peace but 
as a coward shows that he (his emotional self) has already been taught in the virtues of honor and 
courage, after which making the judgment by comparing the different alternatives is depicted as 
requiring comparatively little strain. 
The Narnia novels strongly suggest that other grown-ups who master the skills ought to take up 
the tasks if the homes or the schools should have been unsuccessful. Thus, Professor Kirke’s 
demonstration of logic functions as a substitute for the school’s neglect of the skill, and Mr Beaver 
initiates the children into moral intuitions, and Aslan sets himself as a moral example for them. These 
scenes also resemble to some extent the way Lewis himself learnt logic and virtue. Especially the 
way the children learn Logic from Professor Kirke is reminiscent of Lewis’s own introduction to 
logical thought by a retired head teacher, whose name “Kirk” already hints at the similitude with the 
literary character. In his autobiography, Lewis (Surprised 155–56) depicts how Kirkpatrick’s logical 
precision was introduced to him especially in common discussions, which resembles the informal 
setting around the scene with the Professor in The Chronicles. “If ever a man came near to being a 
purely logical entity, that man was Kirk” (Surprised 157). Sometime afterwards, Lewis met another 
person who influenced his moral judgment. In his battalion in WWI, Lewis met “one Johnson”, and 
in him he “found dialectical sharpness such as I had hitherto known only in Kirk” (222). Logic, 
however, Lewis had already learnt, and this time the “important thing was that he was a man of 
conscience” (222). Lewis describes that he “accepted his principles at once” (223), as he did not have 
a better set of morals, either. The comrade also became the first moral example Lewis imitated: 
“When a boor first enters the society of courteous people what can he do, for a while, except imitate 
the motions? How can he learn except by imitation?” (223). 
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In the light of the analysis above, the awareness of the Moral Law needed for moral judgment 
is, on one hand, innately available in people but, on the other hand, requires being activated through 
acculturation processes by the people surrounding the children. Thus, Lewis’s statement that one 
learns the Moral Law “from parents and teachers, and friends and books, as we learn everything else” 
(Mere Christianity 21) means that one learns the first principles in the same way, for instance, that 
one learns to speak or to read: the capacity is innate but requires activation. It is different, however, 
from other innate capabilities such as the ability to see, which does not require help from the others 
but is entirely activated by nature.  
Education and upbringing represent active ways in which culture affects one’s moral judgment. 
There is also a higher, more unconscious level of cultural influence, as seen in the implicit moral 
beliefs in one’s society at large, to which the analysis will turn next. 
4.3.2 Free Narnians: Moral Judgment and Cultural Beliefs 
This section sets out to analyze the relationship between moral judgment and beliefs that are deeply 
ingrained in one’s culture in The Chronicles. While there are perhaps many nuanced ways in which 
culture affects one’s moral judgment in the Narnia novels, this section focuses on a single aspect that 
is clearly and undoubtedly manifested in the characters’ moral judgment, namely the concept of 
freedom. Throughout the children’s series, the kingdom of Narnia is portrayed as upholding high 
morality, in contrast to some of the neighboring countries, especially the southern country of 
Calormen. This chapter, then, opens by briefly analyzing the Narnian concept of freedom, contrasted 
with the portrayal of physical and mental slavery in Calormen. Finally, it will be shown how the 
concept of freedom in one’s culture affects the moral judgment of the characters. 
The idea of personal freedom in Narnia is present from the very beginning of its creation, and 
it is most clearly seen in the prohibition of physical slavery. In The Magician’s Nephew Aslan exhorts 
Narnia’s first rulers to rule Narnian animals “kindly and fairly, remembering that they are not slaves 
likes the dumb beasts of the world you were born in, but Talking Beasts and free subjects” (MN 82). 
The Narnians are aware of the special freedom they have been endowed with and recognize the moral 
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demands that it places on them, as seen, for instance, in the self-imposed judgment by Bree, a Narnian 
mare: “A free horse and a talking horse mustn’t steal, of course” (HB 214). Bree’s statement suggests 
that, while dumb beasts would not be expected to behave morally, the fact that she is both free and 
rational (as seen in the ability to talk) emphasizes the moral expectations on her. Apart from the 
prohibition of slavery, the Narnian sense of freedom is carried out to cover other aspects of life, too, 
as observed, for instance, in the facts that the Narnian kings and queens “liberated young dwarfs and 
satyrs from being sent to school” (LWW 194) and the overall sense of self-governance even under the 
Narnian rulers. 
The Narnian emphasis on freedom is contrasted with the portrayal of slavery in the country of 
Calormen. The physical scenery of Calormen already conveys the ideas of slavery and other forms 
of moral degeneration as, for instance, the street view of the Calormene capital includes “beggars, 
ragged children, hens, stray dogs, and bare-footed slaves” (HB 230). The link between slavery and 
the Calormene culture does not only point to physical slavery, however, as seen in the fact that Shasta, 
an adopted son living in the south of Calormen, feels that his life is “little better than slavery” there 
(HB 208). Ironically, the Calormenes themselves speak of Narnia as a morally inferior country: the 
Narnians are “hateful […] to all persons of discernment” (HB 257) and “the gods have withheld from 
the barbarians the light of discretion, as that their poetry is not, like ours, full of choice apophthegms 
and useful maxims, but is all of love and war” (HB 260). This extract suggests that taking pride in 
their own culture makes the Calormenes unable to see the moral advantages of the Narnians, further 
blurring their moral judgment. 
Narnia and Calormen are also portrayed as competing for cultural domination in the 
surrounding areas. In a telling scene, Caspian manages to subject the Lone Islands under the Narnian 
rule again after the islands had been disconnected from the Narnian mainland for a long period of 
time. The most emphasized consequence of the islands’ disconnection from Narnia has been the 
introduction of the slave trade, which is connected to Calormen. When interrogated about the slave 
trade by Caspian, Gumpas, who had been leading the islands in the wrong direction, explains the 
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rationale behind it: “For export, your Majesty. Sell ‘em to Calormen mostly; and we have other 
markets” (VDT 450). After the islands are connected to Narnia, the slave trade ends, which also 
suggests that one of the main differences between the Narnian and Calormene cultures lies in their 
conceptions of freedom. 
The most explicit way in which the Narnian and Calormene concepts of freedom affect one’s 
moral judgment can be seen in a scene on the Calormene girl, Aravis, who is offered, according to 
the customs of the land, to be the bride of a vicious, old man. Seeing no honorable escape from the 
situation, she attempts to commit suicide but is prevented from doing so by her horse who suddenly 
starts to speak (HB 222). It seems that Aravis’s attempt to kill herself was perceived by her as a noble 
thing to do, influenced by her culture, as she notes concerning her inability to commit suicide: “And 
I became full of shame for none of my lineage ought to fear death more than the biting of a gnat” 
(MN 222). The Talking Horse, a Narnian, then introduces how Aravis’s situation would be different 
if she only were in Narnia: “‘O my mistress,’ answered the mare, ‘if you were in Narnia you would 
be happy, for in that land no maiden is forced to marry against her will’” (HB 222). When able to see 
the situation through the lens of the Narnian moral culture, Aravis perceives hope, rejoicing in not 
having done any harm to herself, and decides to flee to the morally superior country of Narnia (HB 
222). The emphasized aspect in the moral superiority of Narnia is that of freedom: one’s will is valued 
above rigid customs, and therefore, one can have a say in choosing one’s marriage partner, for 
instance. What this passage suggests is that the idea of what is virtuous and vicious in one’s culture 
affects one’s moral judgment to a great extent – in fact, is a matter of life and death in extreme cases 
like Aravis’s. Helped by someone from a morally healthier culture, one is able to see the moral truths 
more clearly, and, ultimately, by moving to a society with a healthier culture one is able to judge 
better. 
As seen in this analysis, the Narnia novels reveal that deeply held beliefs in one’s culture affect 
moral judgment critically, as do education and upbringing. These aspects also overlap such as in the 
case of Lewis’s critique (discussed above) of the society’s beliefs concerning what constitutes good 
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moral education. The cultural belief that children ought to be taught explicitly and emphatically 
“[t]hings like Do Not Steal” (MN 92) produces educational practices accordingly, which in turn 
affects the children’s judgment. The next section introduces one more aspect in which culture 
influences one’s judgment in Narnia: children’s literature, which is, quite interestingly, perhaps the 
most emphasized aspect when it comes to the role of culture for children’s growth in judgment. 
4.3.3 Right and Wrong Books: Literature and Judgment 
The link between certain genres of literature and sound moral judgment (and discernment in general) 
is a consistent feature in the portrayal of correct judgment in The Chronicles. This reveals what the 
implied author wants his readers to pick up: a habit of reading books like Narnia so that they would 
mature in their judgment. This is also true of Lewis’s moral philosophy: one learns moral intuitions, 
among others, from books (Mere Christianity 21) and poets (“On Ethics” 313). This final section of 
the analysis, then, illustrates this point by analyzing the key passages that connect good judgment 
with (correct) literature in The Chronicles. 
One of the primary genres promoted for moral judgment in Narnia is that of fairy tale, which is 
also mentioned explicitly in the series. The way fairy tales are used in moral judgment can be seen, 
for instance, in the following argument by Digory: 
Very well. I’ll go. But there’s one thing I jolly well mean to say first. I didn’t believe in 
Magic till today. I see now it’s real. Well, if it is, I suppose all the old fairy tales are more 
or less true. And you’re simply a wicked, cruel magician like the ones in the stories. Well, 
I’ve never read a story in which people of that sort weren’t paid out in the end, and I bet 
you will be. And serve you right. (MN 22) 
 
While witnessing “Magic” for the first time makes Digory believe in the moral authority of fairy 
tales, it is the moral message present in the stories that is emphasized in the extract: in all fairy stories 
justice will rule in the end, and so it will be in life, too. It is worthwhile to note here that literature 
does not constitute another means of judgment (such as intuition or logic) but rather an additional 
authority for judgments: fairy tales provide Digory with moral knowledge that he then uses as part of 
his logical reasoning.  
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The fable is also implicitly given as an example of a morally beneficial genre that is applicable 
to moral judgment. This is seen in a scene where Edmund questions a robin that is leading the 
children: “How do we know which side that bird is on? Why shouldn’t it be leading us into a trap?” 
(LWW 138). Peter bases his judgment on why he thinks their guide is trustworthy on “stories”: the 
robins are “good birds in all the stories I’ve read” (LWW 138). Peter’s argument is likely to refer at 
least partially to Sarah Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories (1786), where robins are depicted as teaching 
moral lessons. While the assumption that certain birds are morally good is hardly helpful for the child 
reader per se, it has important implications on a more general level. Perhaps the implied author 
suggests that the child readers of the story, who have probably been told many a fable in their early 
childhood, ought to stick with the traditional morality that is preserved in them. 
What Peter’s argument entails, Wood (249–50) notes, is a belief in “archetypes”, which Wood 
observes also in other similar simplifications in Narnia is such as “apes are cunning” and “asses 
stupid”. Wood (250) is critical of the way archetypes are “reinforced rather than questioned” in 
Narnia, but it is helpful to study such archetypes in light of Lewis’s educational philosophy. For 
Lewis, the task of the educator is “to train in the pupil those responses which are in themselves 
appropriate, whether anyone is making them or not” (Abolition 702). In Lewis’s philosophy, then, 
conformity is viewed positively and, consequently, “archetypes” are seen to bring a sense of clarity 
and safety to one’s conception of the world. As such archetypes are typical of the fable and as there 
are talking animals in Narnia, The Chronicles can be said to include some elements of the fable, too. 
The importance of correct reading for one’s moral judgment is emphasized particularly in The 
Voyage of the Dawn Treader, in which the most distinctive quality that separates the poor protagonists 
from the exemplary ones is their reading habits. On one hand, there is Eustace Scrubb, who is depicted 
as an annoying, nosy brat. What is emphasized in the description of his character is his deficient 
reading habits: Eustace is said to have “liked books if they were books of information and had pictures 
of grain elevators or of fat foreign children doing exercises in model schools” (VDT 425). Later on in 
the story, Eustace runs into problems because of his wrong kind of reading list, which is contrasted 
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to the other protagonists’ reading: when Eustace does not recognize a dragon – his vicious self, as 
suggested by the fact that he turns into a dragon himself – the narrator explains that “Edmund or Lucy 
or you would have recognized it at once, but Eustace had read none of the right books” (VDT 463). 
Eustace’s wrong kind of reading makes him unaware of the dangers of cruel creatures like dragons – 
in other words, of virtue and vice, of moral knowledge that is not learned by reading informative 
books. 
The genre highlighted, especially in The Voyage, as best for promoting correct moral judgment 
is that of fantasy. This is seen in the narrator’s remark that “Edmund or Lucy or you would have 
recognized it at once” (VDT 463; emphasis added), which functions as a self-assertive note that The 
Chronicles of Narnia (a fantasy book) is included in the desired genre. Also, the fact that reading the 
right books would have made one knowledgeable about dragons points to the genre of fantasy. The 
implication is that the reader, by reading fantasy books like Narnia with dragons and clear conceptions 
of good and evil, is doing exactly the right thing – learning vital moral knowledge essential for good 
judgment – whereas books on information are less helpful in real life. The implied author thus 
commends fantasy as a specifically well-fitted genre for moral growth, and the Narnia novels as 
particularly good examples within the genre, affirming the readers of the benefits of their reading. 
Apart from fantasy, the fable is here, too, portrayed as a helpful genre in the scene. When Eustace the 
Dragon comes to the others so that they might help him, Lucy asks if “it came to us to be cured like 
in Androcles and the Lion” (VDT 469). Lucy’s guess, drawn as it is from the “right books” (in this 
case from a fable in Aesop’s Fables), is naturally correct. 
The implied author of The Chronicles of Narnia appears to believe that different genres of 
children’s literature have their proper uses in life. The reason genres like fantasy, fairy tale and fable 
are promoted for moral judgment in the stories appears to be their emphasis on morality. For instance, 
Nikolajeva notes that fantasy and fairy tale share the quality of “the quest or combat between good 
and evil” (“Fairy Tale” 140–41). Also, they form the most common genres where we meet the concept 
of the romantic hero that is essentially “superior to ordinary human beings” (Nikolajeva, Rhetoric 
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30). Such superior characters are “supposed to serve as models not only for the other characters in 
the story but for the readers as well” (32–33), which highlights their special role in fostering moral 
growth. There are other genres that are promoted for different benefits, too. This can be seen, for 
instance, in another passage where Edmund is “the only of the party who had read several detective 
stories” (VDT 482) and saves the others from touching water that turns everything into gold by his 
quick wits. Thus, while fables, fairy tales, and fantasy are advocated for moral judgment, detective 
stories are good for learning logical reasoning. 
In light of this analysis, it is interesting to observe what Lewis had to say about fairy tales, as 
far as moral judgment is concerned. At the center appears to be the concept of “mythopoeia”, coined 
by Lewis’s close friend and colleague, J. R. R. Tolkien. Lewis wrote, for instance, that mythopoeic 
stories do not merely comment on life but add new experiences one could not have had without it 
(“Sometimes” 120). In his review on The Lord of the Rings, Lewis also noted that the mythopoeic 
element can be applied, for instance, “to good and evil, to our endless perils, our anguish, and our 
joys” and “[b]y dipping them in myth we see them more clearly” (“Tolkien’s The Lord of the Ring” 
117). Considering The Chronicles of Narnia, Lewis probably hoped that, by utilizing mythopoeia, he 
could give the readers such an experience of good and evil that, after tasting it, they could go back to 
the real world and experience it through the lens of what they had learnt in the world of fantasy. This 
experience of good and evil brought to the reader through mythopoeia is combined with the cognitive 
portrayals of moral judgment in the stories: by observing (and imitating) how the characters learn and 
practice moral judgment, the readers are able to become aware of judging better in accordance with 
their heightened sense of morality. 
 Although children’s literature has historically tended to be traditional in terms of morality, 
Lewis might have already noted that contemporary children’s fiction was becoming less focused on 
traditional morality. For instance, Digory’s reference to “old” fairy tales as being “more or less true” 
hints that the older stories are more authoritative when it comes to morality (MN 22). Since the 
publication of The Chronicles of Narnia, children’s literature has undergone major changes. 
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Commenting on the situation in the 21st century, Nikolajeva notes that even in Lewis’s cherished 
genre of fantasy “good and evil become ambivalent” (Rhetoric 123). This characteristic of modern 
fantasy would have troubled Lewis. Although he defended the presence of darkness and evil in 
children’s literature, Lewis opined that the categories of good and evil should be kept separate and 
justice prevail in the end: “Let there be wicked kings and beheadings, battles and dungeons, giants 
and dragons, and let villains be soundly killed at the end of the book” (“On Three Ways” 104). Lewis 
thought that confusing the concepts of good and evil in a world which, according to his theory of the 
Tao, was infused with a real Moral Law would be “to give children a false impression” of the reality: 
“Since it is so likely that they will meet cruel enemies, let them at least have heard of brave knights 
and heroic courage” (“On Three Ways” 104). 
Whatever may be true of contemporary children’s literature in general, the fact that the Narnia 
novels are self-assertive about their benefits for training in discernment neatly connects the portrayal 
of moral judgment in the series to the overall purpose of the present study – considering the Narnia 
novels as Character Education when it comes to moral judgment. Since the novels affirm themselves 
as good sources on moral judgment, it is perhaps not far from C. S. Lewis’s original intention, and 
certainly not against his moral philosophy, if one views reading The Chronicles of Narnia as a form 
of moral education, in addition to the aesthetic pleasure they provide their readers with. 
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5 Conclusion and Discussion 
The present research set out to study The Chronicles of Narnia as a form of Character Education, a 
strand of moral education where C. S. Lewis’s moral philosophy and children’s literature have 
recently gained larger interest. While Character Education is concerned with multiple aspects of 
morality, the present work contributed to the former character educational studies by focusing 
explicitly on the portrayal of moral discernment in the series: how are the characters (and the readers) 
encouraged to judge between good and evil, right and wrong, and what are the most relevant elements 
that affect one’s judgment. 
The present study suggests that the Narnia series stands in a category entirely of its own when 
it comes to considering the role of children’s literature in influencing the child readers’ moral 
judgment. The Chronicles provides a thorough and consistent view of moral judgment that is based 
on the rich classical tradition to which C. S. Lewis subscribed. Moreover, the Narnian portrayal of 
moral judgment can be said to represent a largely ‘character educational’ kind of judgment, drawn as 
it is to a great extent from the same beliefs that the Character Education movement is based on. 
Consequently, reading the novels could be seen as an informal kind of Character Education on good 
judgment. 
The Chronicles teaches its child readership a respect for and a clear practice of moral 
discernment. The storyline works to point out the necessity and seriousness of picking up good habits 
of judgment: the characters need thorough discernment to respond truthfully and justly to the moral 
dilemmas they face and even a sincere lack of discretion can bring about disasters of cosmic 
proportions. Most importantly, moral judgment in The Chronicles is not arbitrary but the characters 
are encouraged to judge with reference to objective morality: in order for arguments to have an 
authentic moral claim on someone, they need to stem coherently from the basic laws of logic and 
morality that every Narnian rational creature is aware of. 
Although Narnia portrays basic morality as objective and innately known to everyone, it also 
pays attention to the intricate ways culture affects one’s judgment. One’s moral judgment can be 
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critically fostered or inhibited, for instance, by the kind of education, moral examples, and society 
one has been bestowed with. The Narnia books are also self-assertive when it comes to teaching moral 
judgment, as children’s literature is presented as an especially good source on morality throughout 
the series. Moreover, the stories strongly suggest that, on the one hand, adults are to do their part in 
passing on correct judgment to the next generation and, on the other hand, that children need to be 
open to outside influence in order to learn judgment, whether it is from parents, educators, benevolent 
adults, or children’s literature like the Narnia novels. 
While any reading experience of the series implicitly conveys an invitation to learn moral 
judgment, it is also worthwhile to consider whether some of the elements might be helpful for explicit 
character educational applications. This is especially relevant as The Chronicles is being utilized for 
classroom use by modern character educators such as Pike and Lickona, whose Narnian Virtues 
project aims to create Character Education textbooks based on Lewis’s children’s series (Pike et al.). 
When it comes to teaching moral judgment, it might be suggested based on the present analysis that 
character educators could make use of, for example, the three informal “lessons” that the Pevensie 
children go through in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. These encounters introduce the main 
elements of Lewisian moral judgment to the child protagonists: Professor Kirke initiates the children 
into the practice of Theoretical Reason; Mr Beaver into Practical Reason; and Aslan becomes the 
children’s source of Moral Imitation of the virtue-ethical sort. These scenes could be used as vivid 
examples when teaching the traditional understanding of moral judgment as laid out, for instance, in 
the first part of Lewis’s essay titled “Why I Am Not a Pacifist”. However, the Narnian portrayal of 
Practical Reason deviates to some extent from Lewis’s actual philosophy by emphasizing (possibly 
for artistic purposes) the importance of outward appearance in judging moral character, which could 
be dealt with, for example, by turning the phenomenon into a classroom discussion on why the idea 
might be problematic in real life. 
 The present study confirms the view expressed in previous research that C. S. Lewis’s both 
moral philosophy and The Chronicles of Narnia are highly relevant sources for the contemporary 
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Character Education movement (Pike et al.) and adds that they are also greatly relevant when it comes 
to moral judgment. While the present study focused on the portrayal of moral judgment in The 
Chronicles, a further inquiry into Lewis’s other works might reveal additional insights as regards 
Lewis the character educator’s understanding of moral judgment. For instance, in the preface of his 
novel That Hideous Strength (7), Lewis explicitly notes that the sci-fi novel embodies points made 
in The Abolition of Man, Lewis’s main work on educational philosophy. Although Lewis’s remark 
hardly addresses moral judgment in particular, it is nevertheless clear that the sci-fi series draws on 
Lewis’s moral philosophy. Thus, it would be worthwhile to analyze in a detailed way how the 
portrayal of moral judgment in The Space Trilogy adds to Lewis’s treatment of the subject as a whole, 
and whether the findings would be of interest for contemporary Character Education. 
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